Essays on the economics and regulatory design of power systems

Regulation has always been at the core of power systems. Two of the most important reasons for regulatory interventions to be present in today's power systems are negative environmental externalities from power generation, and the fact that the power grid is a natural monopoly. Against this background, this thesis investigates several aspects of the economics and regulatory design of power systems with a focus on the generation and transmission sector. Specifically, it investigates design alternatives for the organization of the different economic activities in these sectors with the goal to induce short- and long-term efficiency. Novel approaches are suggested to identify and tackle economic and regulatory deficits. The specific challenges that are addressed stem from the time-varying and interdependent temporal and spatial distribution of production (especially, from variable renewable energies) and demand, as well as from the degree and exchange of information between different players in the supply chain for electric power. It is shown in the thesis that weak designs in these fields may entail significant losses of social welfare. Moreover, it provides insights and suggestions regarding the efficient handling of those challenges