Add to ORKGThe phenomenon of shared intention has received much attention in the philosophy of mind and action. Margaret Gilbert (1989, 2000c, 2014b) argues that a shared intention to do A consists in a joint commitment to intend to do A. But we need to know more about the nature of joint commitments to know what exactly this implies. While the persistence of joint commitments has received much attention in the literature, their impersistence has received very little attention. In this paper, we shed light on the impersistence of joint commitments by showing how joint commitments can be dissolved by unexpected events
Given the premise that joint action plays some role in explaining how humans come to understand min...
What is the difference between walking with a friend and walking alongside a stranger? Active debate...
Many philosophers have offered accounts of shared actions aimed at capturing what makes joint action...
The phenomenon of shared intention has received much attention in the philosophy of mind and action....
There is reason to think that a particular concept of joint commitment informs much human behavior. ...
According to Margaret Gilbert, two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they ar...
Abstract According to a widely accepted constraint on the content of intentions, here called the exc...
Leading philosophical accounts of joint activity, such as Michael Bratman’s account of ‘shared inte...
In this paper, we evaluate the proposal that a central function of commitments within joint action i...
In what sense is commitment essential to joint action, and do the participants in a joint action the...
According to Margaret Gilbert, two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they ar...
Joint action enables us to achieve our goals more efficiently than we otherwise could, and in many c...
In this introductory chapter, we recall some of the crucial aspects of Gilbert’s notion of joint com...
In this article I propose an original view of the nature of shared intention. In contrast to psychol...
The debate regarding the nature of joint action has come to a stalemate due to a dependence on intui...
Given the premise that joint action plays some role in explaining how humans come to understand min...
What is the difference between walking with a friend and walking alongside a stranger? Active debate...
Many philosophers have offered accounts of shared actions aimed at capturing what makes joint action...
The phenomenon of shared intention has received much attention in the philosophy of mind and action....
There is reason to think that a particular concept of joint commitment informs much human behavior. ...
According to Margaret Gilbert, two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they ar...
Abstract According to a widely accepted constraint on the content of intentions, here called the exc...
Leading philosophical accounts of joint activity, such as Michael Bratman’s account of ‘shared inte...
In this paper, we evaluate the proposal that a central function of commitments within joint action i...
In what sense is commitment essential to joint action, and do the participants in a joint action the...
According to Margaret Gilbert, two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they ar...
Joint action enables us to achieve our goals more efficiently than we otherwise could, and in many c...
In this introductory chapter, we recall some of the crucial aspects of Gilbert’s notion of joint com...
In this article I propose an original view of the nature of shared intention. In contrast to psychol...
The debate regarding the nature of joint action has come to a stalemate due to a dependence on intui...
Given the premise that joint action plays some role in explaining how humans come to understand min...
What is the difference between walking with a friend and walking alongside a stranger? Active debate...
Many philosophers have offered accounts of shared actions aimed at capturing what makes joint action...