This paper examines two strands of literature regarding economic models of cooperation. First, payoff transformation theories assume that people may not be exclusively motivated by self-interest, but also care about equality and fairness. Second, team reasoning theorists assume that people might reason from the perspective of the team, rather than an individualistic perspective. Can these two theories be unified? In contrast to the consensus among team reasoning theorists, I argue that team reasoning can be viewed as a particular type of payoff transformation. However, I also demonstrate that many payoff transformations yield actions that team reasoning rules out
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not i...
This paper presents an agent-based model of team reasoning in a social dilemma game. Starting from t...
This paper presents an agent-based model of team reasoning in a social dilemma game. Starting from t...
Standard game theory cannot explain the selection of payoff-dominant outcomes that are best for all ...
Standard game theory cannot explain the selection of payoff-dominant outcomes that are best for all ...
In a recent article in this journal, Duijf claims to have proved that team reasoning can be viewed a...
This paper proposes a concept of intentional cooperation for mutual benefit. This concept uses a for...
In many everyday activities, individuals have a common interest in coordinating their actions. Ortho...
Philosophical accounts of collective intentionality typically rely on members to form a personal int...
Orthodox game theory is sometimes criticized for its failure to single out intuitively compelling so...
The game theoretic notion of best-response reasoning is sometimes criticized when its application pr...
In many everyday activities, individuals have a common interest in coordinating their actions. Ortho...
Philosophical accounts of collective intentionality typically rely on members to form a personal int...
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not i...
In this commentary, I argue that there is indeed considerable evidence in support of the notion that...
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not i...
This paper presents an agent-based model of team reasoning in a social dilemma game. Starting from t...
This paper presents an agent-based model of team reasoning in a social dilemma game. Starting from t...
Standard game theory cannot explain the selection of payoff-dominant outcomes that are best for all ...
Standard game theory cannot explain the selection of payoff-dominant outcomes that are best for all ...
In a recent article in this journal, Duijf claims to have proved that team reasoning can be viewed a...
This paper proposes a concept of intentional cooperation for mutual benefit. This concept uses a for...
In many everyday activities, individuals have a common interest in coordinating their actions. Ortho...
Philosophical accounts of collective intentionality typically rely on members to form a personal int...
Orthodox game theory is sometimes criticized for its failure to single out intuitively compelling so...
The game theoretic notion of best-response reasoning is sometimes criticized when its application pr...
In many everyday activities, individuals have a common interest in coordinating their actions. Ortho...
Philosophical accounts of collective intentionality typically rely on members to form a personal int...
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not i...
In this commentary, I argue that there is indeed considerable evidence in support of the notion that...
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not i...
This paper presents an agent-based model of team reasoning in a social dilemma game. Starting from t...
This paper presents an agent-based model of team reasoning in a social dilemma game. Starting from t...