The Hotelling pure location game has been revisited. It is assumed that there are two identical players, strategy sets are one-dimensional, and demand as a function of distance is constant or strictly decreasing. Besides qualitative properties of conditional payoff functions, attention is given to the structure of the equilibrium set, best-response correspondences and the existence of potentials
This paper considers the two-player location game in a closed-loop market with quantity competition....
We consider a Hotelling location game where retailers can choose one of a finite number of locations...
We introduce a cost of location into Hotelling’s (1929) spatial duopoly. We derive the general condi...
We study two-player one-dimensional discrete Hotelling pure location games assuming that demand f(d)...
We revisit two-person one-dimensional pure location games à la Anderson et al. (1992) and show that ...
In this paper, we consider the pure strategy Nash equilibria of generalized Hotelling’s location gam...
In this paper, we try to analyse the optimal location choice in a standard game of horizontal differ...
We study the location equilibrium in Hotelling's model of spatial competition. As d'Aspremont et al,...
We provide a comparison of the location equilibria in a duopoly model under three alternative soluti...
In this paper, we deal with a planar location-price game where firms first select their locations an...
The Hotelling game of pure location allows interpretations in spatial competition, political theory,...
In Hotelling Revisits the Lab: Equilibration in Continuous and Discrete Time we investigate experime...
The Hotelling game of pure location allows interpretations in spatial competition, political theory,...
This paper considers a generalization of the Hotelling model of spatial competition. It is shown tha...
International audienceA pure Hotelling game is a spatial competition between a finite number of play...
This paper considers the two-player location game in a closed-loop market with quantity competition....
We consider a Hotelling location game where retailers can choose one of a finite number of locations...
We introduce a cost of location into Hotelling’s (1929) spatial duopoly. We derive the general condi...
We study two-player one-dimensional discrete Hotelling pure location games assuming that demand f(d)...
We revisit two-person one-dimensional pure location games à la Anderson et al. (1992) and show that ...
In this paper, we consider the pure strategy Nash equilibria of generalized Hotelling’s location gam...
In this paper, we try to analyse the optimal location choice in a standard game of horizontal differ...
We study the location equilibrium in Hotelling's model of spatial competition. As d'Aspremont et al,...
We provide a comparison of the location equilibria in a duopoly model under three alternative soluti...
In this paper, we deal with a planar location-price game where firms first select their locations an...
The Hotelling game of pure location allows interpretations in spatial competition, political theory,...
In Hotelling Revisits the Lab: Equilibration in Continuous and Discrete Time we investigate experime...
The Hotelling game of pure location allows interpretations in spatial competition, political theory,...
This paper considers a generalization of the Hotelling model of spatial competition. It is shown tha...
International audienceA pure Hotelling game is a spatial competition between a finite number of play...
This paper considers the two-player location game in a closed-loop market with quantity competition....
We consider a Hotelling location game where retailers can choose one of a finite number of locations...
We introduce a cost of location into Hotelling’s (1929) spatial duopoly. We derive the general condi...