We consider a group of receivers who share a common prior on a finite state space and who observe private correlated signals that are contingent on the true state of the world. We show that, while necessary, Bayes plausibility is not sufficient for a distribution over posterior belief vectors to be inducible, and we provide a characterization of inducible distributions. We classify communication strategies as minimal, direct, and language independent, and show that any inducible distribution can be induced by a language independent communication strategy (LICS). We investigate 12 the role of the different classes of communication strategies for the amount of higher order information that is revealed to receivers. We show that the least info...
We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering informati...
We consider settings where a collective intelligence is formed by aggregating information contribute...
This article asks when communication with certifiable information leads to complete information reve...
We consider a group of receivers who share a common prior on a finite state space and who observe pr...
In a world where rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence the b...
We study learning statistical properties from strategic agents with private information. In this pro...
We study a model of pairwise communication in a finite population of Bayesian agents. We show that, ...
We study a setting where Bayesian agents with a common prior have private information related to an ...
In this dissertation, we analyze the interaction between intelligent and selfish agents in non-coope...
A fundamental result in Bayesian persuasion and information design states that a distribution of pos...
This paper presents the communication process of passionate belief messages according to a protocol,...
This dissertation considers a problem where a single agent or a group of agents aim to estimate/lear...
In a world in which rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence th...
Inferring the information structure of other agents is necessary to derive optimal mechanisms/signal...
In this paper, we generalize the notion of a communication equilibrium (Forges 1986, Myerson 1986) o...
We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering informati...
We consider settings where a collective intelligence is formed by aggregating information contribute...
This article asks when communication with certifiable information leads to complete information reve...
We consider a group of receivers who share a common prior on a finite state space and who observe pr...
In a world where rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence the b...
We study learning statistical properties from strategic agents with private information. In this pro...
We study a model of pairwise communication in a finite population of Bayesian agents. We show that, ...
We study a setting where Bayesian agents with a common prior have private information related to an ...
In this dissertation, we analyze the interaction between intelligent and selfish agents in non-coope...
A fundamental result in Bayesian persuasion and information design states that a distribution of pos...
This paper presents the communication process of passionate belief messages according to a protocol,...
This dissertation considers a problem where a single agent or a group of agents aim to estimate/lear...
In a world in which rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence th...
Inferring the information structure of other agents is necessary to derive optimal mechanisms/signal...
In this paper, we generalize the notion of a communication equilibrium (Forges 1986, Myerson 1986) o...
We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering informati...
We consider settings where a collective intelligence is formed by aggregating information contribute...
This article asks when communication with certifiable information leads to complete information reve...