The Party for Freedom: balancing between mission, votes and office

The Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) was founded on 22 February 2006 by Geert Wilders. Before he founded the PVV, Wilders had been a parliamentarian for the liberal-conservative People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD). Disappointed with the VVD’s moderate nationalist course – and especially its favourable position regarding Turkey’s accession to the European Union (EU) – he broke with the party in September 2004. He became an independent member of parliament until he founded the PVV two years later. The PVV adopted the classic profile of a radical right-wing populist party, focusing on niche issues such as immigration, Islam, law and order and European integration (Lucardie 2009; Van Heerden et al. 2014: 126; Vossen 2011). Indeed, it developed into a populist party quickly, vehemently critiquing the cultural and political elites (Vossen 2013: 79; Rooduijn 2013: 87). The PVV’s exclusive nationalist positions with respect to immigration and Islam have affected the party’s perceived legitimacy, among both politicians and the public. Statements such as Wilders’ claim that a ‘head rag tax’ should be introduced or that there should be fewer Moroccans in the Netherlands have caused backlashes. Wilders was frequently required by members of parliament and journalists to account for, or to distance himself from, manifestations of extremism – which included a call for support for the PVV that was published on extremist websites, the presence of neo-Nazis at a PVV demonstration and international contacts with parties like the National Front (Front National, FN) and Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang, VB) (NRC 13-11-2007; NRC 25-09-2013). Particularly in its building-up stage, the PVV suffered some negative electoral effects due to its extremist reputation (Van Heerden 2014: 20-34, 91). The PVV’s fate, however,was not unique. Anti-immigration parties tend to be demonised more than other party families in the Dutch media; that is, they are portrayed more frequently as absolutely evil and are associated with Nazism/fascism (Van Heerden 2014). Such demonisation can have a negative electoral impact because voters are willing to support anti-immigration parties only if they are perceived as legitimate (Bos and Van der Brug 2010). The demonisation of Dutch anti-immigration parties, however, appeared to decrease after the turn of the millennium. In the 1990s, Dutch radical right-wing populist parties like the Centre Democrats (Centrum Democraten, CD) were heavily decried as morally abject; if it got any attention at all, the CD was portrayed as dangerously extremist in the media. The party suffered an informal cordon sanitaire following its promising electoral gains in the local elections of 1990. Its leader, Hans Janmaat, was ignored by mainstream politicians when he spoke in the Dutch parliament, and the media, too, largely ignored the CD and its leader. Janmaat was prosecuted and sentenced for discrimination based on racism. Electorally, the CD suffered and gained only 2.4 per cent of the votes in the 1994 national election. The PVV was demonised less than the CD, and the party was never seen as a political pariah (Van Heerden 2014: 33). The PVV’s path to legitimacy had to some extent been paved by the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF), a radical right-wing populist party that had been founded in 2002. At that time, Islamic terrorism had become a highly significant topic due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Tensions due to terrorist attacks in the name of Islam were revived in the Netherlands when film director and producer Theo van Gogh was murdered by a Muslim fundamentalist in 2004. Shortly before this event, Wilders had left the VVD. Having received death threats, he was put under strict and permanent surveillance. The death threats against Wilders and Fortuyn’s murder signified how dramatically tensions over immigration and Islam had escalated in the Netherlands. As a result, the LPF and PVV did not face a cordon sanitaire by the media and political parties. In addition, the parties potentially had better ‘reputational shields’ than pre- vious Dutch anti-immigration parties; they were better equipped to fend off accusations of racism and extremism because they could not easily be associated with (neo-) Nazism or fascism (Ivarsflaten 2006). As PVV leader Wilders used to say: ‘We have two main advantages compared to parties abroad. … We descend from the respectable VVD and not from an obscure neo-Nazi movement. We are also pro-Israel, so one cannot accuse us of anti-Semitism’ (Vrij Nederland 21-05-2014). Moreover, since Wilders had been a member of parliament in a respectable party, his personal reputation very much dominated the reputations of the party’s parliamentarians, who did not necessarily come from the mainstream. Radical right-wing populist parties are usually strongly personalised and leader-centred, and Wilders’ position is exceptionally dominant. The PVV, in fact, has only two official members: Geert Wilders and the foundation Groep Wilders (since 2008, Stichting Vrienden van de PVV).2 At the same time, it should be noted that although the PVV’s genesis has given the party relative credibility with respect to both legitimacy and competence, its legitimacy is not as strong as that of vested parties (Bos et al. 2011)