Lessons From the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

On September 11, 2001, the United States encountered two comprehensive and unforeseen dilemmas, brought forth by the suicide attacks which took the lives of many American citizens. A plan of action had to be formulated, for recovering internally by ensuring the safety and comfort of American citizens, and for avenging the terrorist attacks by targeting Al-Qaeda, a terrorist group which operated out of the Middle East (originally Pakistan). The Bush Administration’s solution was to launch a public, global War on Terror which “[would] not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” Nineteen years later, the U.S. military is operating counterterrorism missions in eighty nations on six continents, and it has cost nearly six trillion dollars and half a million lives. However, a significant portion of the U.S. strategy has focused on Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result of involvement in these two countries and of the failure to reach counterterrorist and state-building goals, American public opinion has shifted largely against the wars. Yet, despite a toppling national debt and both vertical and horizontal growth of terrorist groups, both Obama and Trump initially supported increasing troop levels to the Middle East. Since both wars were similar in their mission, these strategic failures offer many meaningful lessons. An analysis of what caused the U.S. to enter Iraq and Afghanistan and what keeps U.S. military presence in the Middle East, as well as an understanding of weak state dynamics, is necessary to determine the primary lesson(s) that can be drawn from the conflicts