The paper presents a dilemma for both epistemic and non-epistemic versions of conceivability-based accounts of modal knowledge. On the one horn, non-epistemic accounts do not elucidate the essentialist knowledge they would be committed to. On the other, epistemic accounts do not elucidate everyday life de re modal knowledge. In neither case, therefore, do conceivability accounts elucidate de re modal knowledge
Modal agnosticism is the view that we must be agnostic about whether things could have turned out di...
How do we know what's (metaphysically) possible and impossible? Arguments from Kripke and Putnam sug...
This collection highlights the new trend away from rationalism and toward empiricism in the epistemo...
One’s involvement with the world seems limited merely to things as they are; hence, modal knowledge—...
The starting point of this paper is an argument to the conclusion that the definition of metaphysica...
This paper discusses, with the help of three examples from modal epistemology, what we can learn fro...
This thesis offers an answer to the following question and discusses how that answer relates to cert...
This essay aims to redress the contention that epistemic possibility cannot be a guide to the princi...
This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the nature of epistemic modality...
The paper provides an explanation of our knowledge of metaphysical modality, or modal knowledge, fro...
We give a theory of epistemic modals in the framework of possibility semantics and axiomatize the co...
According to Williamson (The philosophy of philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007), our knowledge of me...
Assertions about metaphysical modality (hereafter modality) play central roles in philosophical theo...
I compare two prominent approaches to knowledge of metaphysical modality, the more traditional appro...
Modal rationalism is the view that conceivability is a reliable apriori guide to modal knowledge. Th...
Modal agnosticism is the view that we must be agnostic about whether things could have turned out di...
How do we know what's (metaphysically) possible and impossible? Arguments from Kripke and Putnam sug...
This collection highlights the new trend away from rationalism and toward empiricism in the epistemo...
One’s involvement with the world seems limited merely to things as they are; hence, modal knowledge—...
The starting point of this paper is an argument to the conclusion that the definition of metaphysica...
This paper discusses, with the help of three examples from modal epistemology, what we can learn fro...
This thesis offers an answer to the following question and discusses how that answer relates to cert...
This essay aims to redress the contention that epistemic possibility cannot be a guide to the princi...
This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the nature of epistemic modality...
The paper provides an explanation of our knowledge of metaphysical modality, or modal knowledge, fro...
We give a theory of epistemic modals in the framework of possibility semantics and axiomatize the co...
According to Williamson (The philosophy of philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007), our knowledge of me...
Assertions about metaphysical modality (hereafter modality) play central roles in philosophical theo...
I compare two prominent approaches to knowledge of metaphysical modality, the more traditional appro...
Modal rationalism is the view that conceivability is a reliable apriori guide to modal knowledge. Th...
Modal agnosticism is the view that we must be agnostic about whether things could have turned out di...
How do we know what's (metaphysically) possible and impossible? Arguments from Kripke and Putnam sug...
This collection highlights the new trend away from rationalism and toward empiricism in the epistemo...
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