A Case for Moral History – Universality and Change in Ethics after Wittgenstein

In this paper, I raise the question of how the tradition of ethics afterWittgenstein tends to neglect the historicity of morality, in a way whichis not representative of the complexity of Wittgenstein’s own thinking. Ianalyse a tendency towards one-sidedness in the preferred diet ofphilosophical examples, where focus lies on recognition of, and ethicalattentiveness to, a fellow person or creature. Although these examplesplay an important role in their own right, the overuse of such examples,along with a certain notion of “philosophical grammar”, detracts from ahistorically sensitive investigation of our ethical forms of life.In this paper, I raise the question of how the tradition of ethics afterWittgenstein tends to neglect the historicity of morality, in a way whichis not representative of the complexity of Wittgenstein’s own thinking. Ianalyse a tendency towards one-sidedness in the preferred diet ofphilosophical examples, where focus lies on recognition of, and ethicalattentiveness to, a fellow person or creature. Although these examplesplay an important role in their own right, the overuse of such examples,along with a certain notion of “philosophical grammar”, detracts from ahistorically sensitive investigation of our ethical forms of life