Although still a distant second to monopoly, buyer power and monopsony are hot topics in the antitrust community. Despite the increasing interest in monopsony and buyer power, relatively few cases have actually been brought. Given the relatively few antitrust cases, the legal standards for monopsony claims are less developed than for monopoly claims. In recent years, courts, competition agencies, and scholars in addressing monopsony begin with a simple premise: monopsony is the mirror image of monopoly. But as this Article contends, courts and agencies should be careful when importing monopolization standards for monopsony cases. What works for monopolization claims may not necessarily work for monopsony claims. This Article discusses two k...
The efforts of activist antitrust lawyers to redefine the contours of attempted monopolization under...
This article introduces a special symposium issue of the Antitrust Law Journal based on a conference...
The reluctance of antitrust to condemn parallel exclusion permits oligopolies to be entrenched. This...
Although still a distant second to monopoly, buyer power and monopsony are hot topics in the antitru...
The conventional antitrust wisdom is that buyer side market power or monopsony is so unusual and so ...
This Comment will focus on the application of section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act to actions in t...
This article examines the economic consequences of collusion in both the output market and one of th...
Monopolization, the restriction of competition by a dominant firm, is regulated in roughly half of t...
We develop a two-stage duopoly model: At stage one, firms invest in their products or processes; at ...
Instances in which purchasers collude to depress price raise complex enforcement issues if one adher...
Standard monopsony theory, old and new, lacks a realistic criterion to distinguish between monopsony...
Although there is agreement on the basic economic principles that should apply to monopolization cas...
In one sentence § 2 of the Sherman Act condemns firms who “monopolize,” “attempt to monopolize” or “...
This article seeks an answer to a question that should be well settled: for purposes of antitrust an...
Aaron Director and Edward Levi discuss the difficult problems of regulating monopoly firms that acq...
The efforts of activist antitrust lawyers to redefine the contours of attempted monopolization under...
This article introduces a special symposium issue of the Antitrust Law Journal based on a conference...
The reluctance of antitrust to condemn parallel exclusion permits oligopolies to be entrenched. This...
Although still a distant second to monopoly, buyer power and monopsony are hot topics in the antitru...
The conventional antitrust wisdom is that buyer side market power or monopsony is so unusual and so ...
This Comment will focus on the application of section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act to actions in t...
This article examines the economic consequences of collusion in both the output market and one of th...
Monopolization, the restriction of competition by a dominant firm, is regulated in roughly half of t...
We develop a two-stage duopoly model: At stage one, firms invest in their products or processes; at ...
Instances in which purchasers collude to depress price raise complex enforcement issues if one adher...
Standard monopsony theory, old and new, lacks a realistic criterion to distinguish between monopsony...
Although there is agreement on the basic economic principles that should apply to monopolization cas...
In one sentence § 2 of the Sherman Act condemns firms who “monopolize,” “attempt to monopolize” or “...
This article seeks an answer to a question that should be well settled: for purposes of antitrust an...
Aaron Director and Edward Levi discuss the difficult problems of regulating monopoly firms that acq...
The efforts of activist antitrust lawyers to redefine the contours of attempted monopolization under...
This article introduces a special symposium issue of the Antitrust Law Journal based on a conference...
The reluctance of antitrust to condemn parallel exclusion permits oligopolies to be entrenched. This...