Add to ORKGIn this paper, I consider an argument of Harvey Siegel's according to which there can be no hypothet...
How does logic relate to rational belief? Is logic normative for belief, as some say? What, if anyth...
We argue that indeterminate probabilities are not only rationally permissible for a Bayesian agent, ...
Building on recent formal work by Aleks Knoks, we explore how the idea that certain epistemic norms ...
This paper concentrates on a particular sort of case where it’s plausible that epistemic requirement...
It seems that epistemically rational agents should avoid incoherent combinations of beliefs and shou...
Real-world agents do not know all consequences of what they know. But we are reluctant to say that a...
Formally-inclined epistemologists often theorize about ideally rational agents--agents who exemplify...
In this paper, I consider an argument of Harvey Siegel's according to which there can be no hypothet...
How does logic relate to rational belief? Is logic normative for belief, as some say? What, if anyth...
We argue that indeterminate probabilities are not only rationally permissible for a Bayesian agent, ...
Building on recent formal work by Aleks Knoks, we explore how the idea that certain epistemic norms ...
This paper concentrates on a particular sort of case where it’s plausible that epistemic requirement...
It seems that epistemically rational agents should avoid incoherent combinations of beliefs and shou...
Real-world agents do not know all consequences of what they know. But we are reluctant to say that a...
Formally-inclined epistemologists often theorize about ideally rational agents--agents who exemplify...
In this paper, I consider an argument of Harvey Siegel's according to which there can be no hypothet...
How does logic relate to rational belief? Is logic normative for belief, as some say? What, if anyth...
We argue that indeterminate probabilities are not only rationally permissible for a Bayesian agent, ...