We study the assignment of discrete resources in a general model encompassing a wide range of applied environments, such as school choice, course allocation, and refugee resettlement. We allow single-unit and general multi-unit demands and any linear constraints. We prove the Second Welfare Theorem for these environments and a strong version of the First Welfare Theorem. In this way, we establish an equivalence between strong efficiency and decentralization through prices in discrete environments. Showing that all strongly efficient outcomes can be implemented through pseudomarkets, we provide a foundation for using pseudomarkets in market design
In general screening problems, implementable allocation rules correspond exactly to Walrasian equili...
We consider a differential information economy with infinitely many commodities and analyze the veto...
We revisit the issue of existence of equilibrium in economies with indivisible goods and money, in w...
We study the assignment of discrete resources in a general model encompassing a wide range of applie...
We study the assignment of objects in environments without transfers allowing for single-unit and ge...
For economies in which goods are available in several (discrete) units, this paper identifies two no...
For economies in which goods are available in several (discrete) units, this paper identifies two no...
We study random assignment economies with expected-utility agents, each of them eventually obtaining...
[eng] This thesis is devoted mainly to the study of assignment problems in two- sided markets. The ...
ED EPSInternational audienceIn an exchange economy, we define a discrete exchange process, which is ...
This paper considers market economies involving the choice of a public environment when there are no...
Allocation and exchange of discrete resources such as kidneys, school seats, and many other resource...
We consider the problem of allocating objects to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. E...
In an exchange economy, we provide a discrete exchange process, which is Walrasian since the trades ...
We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-transfer allocation of indivisible ob-jects that honors ...
In general screening problems, implementable allocation rules correspond exactly to Walrasian equili...
We consider a differential information economy with infinitely many commodities and analyze the veto...
We revisit the issue of existence of equilibrium in economies with indivisible goods and money, in w...
We study the assignment of discrete resources in a general model encompassing a wide range of applie...
We study the assignment of objects in environments without transfers allowing for single-unit and ge...
For economies in which goods are available in several (discrete) units, this paper identifies two no...
For economies in which goods are available in several (discrete) units, this paper identifies two no...
We study random assignment economies with expected-utility agents, each of them eventually obtaining...
[eng] This thesis is devoted mainly to the study of assignment problems in two- sided markets. The ...
ED EPSInternational audienceIn an exchange economy, we define a discrete exchange process, which is ...
This paper considers market economies involving the choice of a public environment when there are no...
Allocation and exchange of discrete resources such as kidneys, school seats, and many other resource...
We consider the problem of allocating objects to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. E...
In an exchange economy, we provide a discrete exchange process, which is Walrasian since the trades ...
We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-transfer allocation of indivisible ob-jects that honors ...
In general screening problems, implementable allocation rules correspond exactly to Walrasian equili...
We consider a differential information economy with infinitely many commodities and analyze the veto...
We revisit the issue of existence of equilibrium in economies with indivisible goods and money, in w...