Dmaris Masham and Molyneux’s Question: What Response would Masham have given?

This chapter discusses two aspects of Masham\u27s philosophy as they relate to Molyneux\u27s question. First, why didn\u27t Masham discuss Molyneux\u27s question in her writing? The author\u27s answer reflects two aspects of Masham\u27s life: (1) her practical duties constrained her philosophical interests to primarily religious and moral questions, and (2) as someone who experienced her own vision impairment, she may have disliked something about Molyneux\u27s question and thus duly ignored it. Second, given her philosophical commitments, what might Masham\u27s response to Molyneux have been? While Masham didn\u27t write a treatise on sensation or lay the foundation for an understanding of the human mind, her interests did draw her into debates about the nature and importance of sensory experience, particularly in her engagement with occasionalism, the notion that God is the direct cause of all physical events and consequently sensory experience. Exploring Masham\u27s writings within the context of Molyneux\u27s question provides a unique insight into Masham\u27s philosophy of mind, her views of perception, and the roles of reason and experience in our understanding of the world