Why darwinian reductionism is dangerous to persons?

The Bachelor thesis explores relations between two understandings of human being – naturalistic and ontological – and the concept of dignity. It is assumed that anthropological interpretation of a person must ultimately evolve into the justification of a legal entity and establish a normative dimension on the political scene. The dignity of the person here is important as a category that denotes the awareness of duties and responsibilities to society. In the same way, the society must assume its duty and responsibility in respect of each person recognized as dignified. Different understandings of human being are presented by analyzing philosophical perspectives of three authors: Peter Singer, Robert Spaemann and Hans Jonas. Peter Singer, following Darwin’s thought, concideres human being as purely natural being. Author rejects the principle of the sanctity of human life and proposes a new definition of person based on empirical characteristics. Singer attempts to establish science-based ‘Practical Ethics’ that would ensure equality of different biological species. Instead of objective moral values Singer suggests the principle of equal concideration of interests. In his philosophy animals are considered to be a part of moral community, while embryos, people with brain damage, infants are removed from the moral sphere. Dignity is no longer seen as a priori given to human beings. Meanwhile, both Robert Spaemann and Hans Jonas claim undeniable value of human existence. Spaemann opposes the Darwinian perspective and provides an ontological interpretation of personhood. According to Spaemann, dignity is a predicate of humanity, because only human beings are created in the image of God and only humans are considered to be moral beings. Jonas proposes slightly different ontological argument. Philosopher refers to the principle of teleology and argues that the existence of every being – not just human being – is by itself meaningful. Moreover, the principle of teleology in author's reasoning becomes the main cause of responsible action towards animals and nature. The thesis consists of two main parts. The first part compares the functional and ontological understanding of the person proposed by the authors. The second part deals with different understandings of moral commitment. Following questions are considered: what characteristics define person, what is considered to be a dignified existence, how is the moral behavior understood, how is moral community understood, is the dignity considered to be the cause and purpose of responsible action. It is argued that, the position of Spaemann and Jonas, claiming the self-worth of the person and the moral autonomy of the person, which enables practical reasoning, is identical to the understanding of human being affirmed by Western institutions. Meanwhile, the functional approach to personhood and morality presented by Singer contradicts the concept of inherent dignity of the human person, affirmed in various resolutions and declarations of international bodies and national constitutions. If human being is considered as purely natural being, absolute and unconditional values – first and foremost the dignity of the person and the stable responsibility towards this dignity – are rejected. In addition, ‘Practical Ethics’ based on preference utilitarianism does not provide a solid basis for moral commitment to another person. Within Singer's reasoning, killing – depending on the being whose interests are affected and the number of confronting interests – is considered a morally grounded act. No being is recognized as irrevocably valuable. In conclusion the naturalistic interpretation of human being, which associates person with physical characteristics and moral action with the deduction of the greatest benefit, is dangerous because it is not sufficient to justify the inviolability of dignity. The concept of dignity requires metaphysical assumptions about humanity