Hegel, Kant and the Antinomies of pure reason

Hegel is profoundly critical of Kant’s account of the antinomies of pure reason and especially of what he regards as Kant’s “trivial” resolution of them (EL § 48 Remark). Yet at the same time Hegel emphasises the considerable significance of Kant’s account. “These Kantian antinomies”, he writes, “will always remain an important part of the critical philosophy”, since “they, more than anything else, brought about the downfall of previous metaphysics and can be regarded as a main transition into more recent philosophy” (in particular that of Hegel himself) (SL 190 / LS 198). 1 How then, according to Hegel, did the antinomies help take us from pre-Kantian metaphysics to his own speculative philosophy