We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time-step, the preference list of some player may change by swapping random adjacent members. The goal of a central agency (algorithm) is to maintain an approximately stable matching, in terms of number of blocking pairs, at all time-steps. The changes in the preference lists are not reported to the algorithm, but must instead be probed explicitly. We design an algorithm that in expectation and with high probability maintains a matching that has at most O((log n)2) blocking pairs.</p
Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society. We address ...
In the stable matching problem, given a two-sided matching market where each agent has ordinal prefe...
The paper proposes an algorithm to compute the set of many-to-many stable matchings when agents have...
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time-step, the pre...
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time-step, the pre...
[[abstract]]The stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that...
Stable matching is a widely studied problem in social choice theory. For the basiccentralized case, ...
We studied the stable marriage problem with dynamic preferences. The dynamic preference model allows...
We study dynamic matching problems in graphs among agents with preferences. Agents and/or edges of t...
We study dynamic matching problems in graphs among agents with preferences. Agents and/or edges of t...
An instance $I$ of the Stable Matching Problem (SMP) is given by a bipartite graph with a preference...
Abstract. We study dynamic matching problems in graphs among agents with preferences. Agents and/or ...
Matching markets are ubiquitous, including college admissions, school choice, reviewer paper matchin...
Abstract. We study dynamic matching problems in graphs among agents with preferences. Agents and/or ...
In this paper, we consider the problem of Popular Matching of strictly ordered preference lists. A P...
Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society. We address ...
In the stable matching problem, given a two-sided matching market where each agent has ordinal prefe...
The paper proposes an algorithm to compute the set of many-to-many stable matchings when agents have...
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time-step, the pre...
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time-step, the pre...
[[abstract]]The stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that...
Stable matching is a widely studied problem in social choice theory. For the basiccentralized case, ...
We studied the stable marriage problem with dynamic preferences. The dynamic preference model allows...
We study dynamic matching problems in graphs among agents with preferences. Agents and/or edges of t...
We study dynamic matching problems in graphs among agents with preferences. Agents and/or edges of t...
An instance $I$ of the Stable Matching Problem (SMP) is given by a bipartite graph with a preference...
Abstract. We study dynamic matching problems in graphs among agents with preferences. Agents and/or ...
Matching markets are ubiquitous, including college admissions, school choice, reviewer paper matchin...
Abstract. We study dynamic matching problems in graphs among agents with preferences. Agents and/or ...
In this paper, we consider the problem of Popular Matching of strictly ordered preference lists. A P...
Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society. We address ...
In the stable matching problem, given a two-sided matching market where each agent has ordinal prefe...
The paper proposes an algorithm to compute the set of many-to-many stable matchings when agents have...