What political variables explain variations in subnational fiscal expenditures on interest payments on the debt? The author argues that the political budget cycle and center‐right political party ideology—rather than the effective number of parties, alternation of power, ideological proximity between the central government and constituent units, or most forms of political party ideology—can help explain the level of expenditures on interest payment of subnational debt in India. The core empirical finding is that significant increases in expenditures on the debt occur the year in which a state assembly election is held in India
Why and under what conditions do governments borrow before elections? This thesis aims to shed light...
This paper examines the effects of political factors on allocation of revenue budget for development...
Using annual data from India, we investigate whether central governments' economic policies are affe...
This paper tests two predictions implied by models of the common-pool game in federations where subn...
Many states in India have time and again elected a multiparty or a coalition government. Research so...
Using data from the 14 major states of India, we investigate whether state governments' fiscal polic...
In the quasi-federal democratic polity that India has, lobbying for central funds by the states is o...
International audienceIn the quasi-federal democratic polity that India has, lobbying for central fu...
In this paper we argue that the search for opportunism in government budgets is weakened by the abse...
Why and under what conditions do governments borrow before elections? This thesis aims to shed light...
In Western democracies it is held that parties and their positions affect how politicians choose to ...
Abstract: This paper performs three empirical exercises to determine the patterns and properties of ...
What explains variations in electoral volatility? The authors argue that fiscal space—availability o...
This paper examines the effects of political factors on allocation of revenue budget for development...
A political budget cycle is a periodic fluctua-tion in a government’s fiscal policies, which is indu...
Why and under what conditions do governments borrow before elections? This thesis aims to shed light...
This paper examines the effects of political factors on allocation of revenue budget for development...
Using annual data from India, we investigate whether central governments' economic policies are affe...
This paper tests two predictions implied by models of the common-pool game in federations where subn...
Many states in India have time and again elected a multiparty or a coalition government. Research so...
Using data from the 14 major states of India, we investigate whether state governments' fiscal polic...
In the quasi-federal democratic polity that India has, lobbying for central funds by the states is o...
International audienceIn the quasi-federal democratic polity that India has, lobbying for central fu...
In this paper we argue that the search for opportunism in government budgets is weakened by the abse...
Why and under what conditions do governments borrow before elections? This thesis aims to shed light...
In Western democracies it is held that parties and their positions affect how politicians choose to ...
Abstract: This paper performs three empirical exercises to determine the patterns and properties of ...
What explains variations in electoral volatility? The authors argue that fiscal space—availability o...
This paper examines the effects of political factors on allocation of revenue budget for development...
A political budget cycle is a periodic fluctua-tion in a government’s fiscal policies, which is indu...
Why and under what conditions do governments borrow before elections? This thesis aims to shed light...
This paper examines the effects of political factors on allocation of revenue budget for development...
Using annual data from India, we investigate whether central governments' economic policies are affe...