This article addresses the issue of whether large shareholders in Victorian public companies were active in the control of companies or were simply wealthy rentiers. Using ownership records for 890 firm-years, we examine the control rights, socio-occupational background, and wealth of large shareholders. We find that many large shareholders had limited voting rights and neither they nor family members were directors. This implies that the majority of public companies in the second half of the nineteenth century cannot be characterized as family companies and that large shareholders are better viewed as wealthy gentlemen capitalists rather than entrepreneurs
We present data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, making an eff...
Scholars have long debated whether ownership matters for firm performance. The standard view regardi...
Scholars have long debated whether ownership matters for firm performance. The standard view regardi...
This article addresses the issue of whether large shareholders in Victorian public companies were ac...
Using ownership and control data for 890 firm-years, this article examines the concentration of capi...
Using ownership and control data for 890 firm-years, this article examines the concentration of capi...
Using ownership and control data for 890 firm‐years, this article examines the concentration of capi...
Scholars have long debated whether ownership matters for firm performance. The standard view regardi...
© Economic History Society 2014. Using ownership and control data for 890 firm-years, this article e...
© Economic History Society 2014. Using ownership and control data for 890 firm-years, this article e...
© Economic History Society 2014. Using ownership and control data for 890 firm-years, this article e...
This article analyzes the ownership structures and governance institutions of New York’s corporation...
Scholars have long debated whether ownership matters for firm performance. The standard view regardi...
Scholars have long debated whether ownership matters for firm performance. The standard view regardi...
We present data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, making an eff...
We present data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, making an eff...
Scholars have long debated whether ownership matters for firm performance. The standard view regardi...
Scholars have long debated whether ownership matters for firm performance. The standard view regardi...
This article addresses the issue of whether large shareholders in Victorian public companies were ac...
Using ownership and control data for 890 firm-years, this article examines the concentration of capi...
Using ownership and control data for 890 firm-years, this article examines the concentration of capi...
Using ownership and control data for 890 firm‐years, this article examines the concentration of capi...
Scholars have long debated whether ownership matters for firm performance. The standard view regardi...
© Economic History Society 2014. Using ownership and control data for 890 firm-years, this article e...
© Economic History Society 2014. Using ownership and control data for 890 firm-years, this article e...
© Economic History Society 2014. Using ownership and control data for 890 firm-years, this article e...
This article analyzes the ownership structures and governance institutions of New York’s corporation...
Scholars have long debated whether ownership matters for firm performance. The standard view regardi...
Scholars have long debated whether ownership matters for firm performance. The standard view regardi...
We present data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, making an eff...
We present data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, making an eff...
Scholars have long debated whether ownership matters for firm performance. The standard view regardi...
Scholars have long debated whether ownership matters for firm performance. The standard view regardi...