IS CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFECCTIVE

The creation of the Intelligence Community was derived from the National Security Act of 1947 which sought a need to have an organized community specifically geared towards the collection of intelligence to prevent strategic surprise. As time went on, there evolved a need to have effective mechanisms to oversee this community. Congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community (IC) is currently insufficient for several reasons. First, the IC continues to grow exponentially to address emerging threats around the world. The advent of technology allows for advanced methods of collection platforms that existing oversight policies did not consider when the policies were written. These policies require the heads of agencies to come to terms on collection tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP’s) therefore, governing policies are not written quickly enough to properly enforce compliance until violations are discovered and reported. Additionally, many of those charged with oversight (members of Congress) are not sufficiently familiar with the intelligence profession and either prefer to outsource the oversight responsibility or trust the various intelligence establishments to mind their own processes. This thesis will argue that current oversight protocols are insufficient, though mildly effective. The argument will include the rationale for ramping up intelligence capabilities at the onset of hostilities and illustrate through historical review how this process continues today. The argument will also support a method of adding proper and effective intelligence oversight to a Congressional body that will be difficult to circumvent. This paper will focus on getting to the root cause of ineffective congressional oversight