When not all objects are acceptable to all agents, maximizing the number of objects actually assigned is an important design concern. We compute the guaranteed size ratio of the Probabilistic Serial mechanism, i.e., the worst ratio of the actual expected size to the maximal feasible size. It converges decreasingly to 1 − 1 e 63.2% as the maximal size increases. It is the best ratio of any Envy-Free assignment mechanism
School districts and other institutions allocating objects without the use of transfers tend to rely...
We study ex-post fairness in the object allocation problem where objects are valuable and commonly o...
Matching with preferences has great potential to coordinate the efficient allocation of scarce resou...
When not all objects are acceptable to all agents, maximizing the number of objects actually assign...
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individually rational assignments. We show that it...
We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem), i.e., the problem of a...
We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem),i.e., the problem of al...
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable outcomes. We show...
We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem), i.e., the problem of a...
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to the...
In unit-demand and multi-copy object allocation problems, we say that a mechanism size-wise dominat...
Inspired by real-world applications such as the assignment of pupils to schools or the allocation of...
I study large random assignment economies with a continuum of agents and a finite number of object t...
Abstract. In the random assignment problem, the probabilistic serial mechanism (Bo-gomolnaia and Mou...
The problem of optimally assigning individuals to heterogeneous objects so that each individual is a...
School districts and other institutions allocating objects without the use of transfers tend to rely...
We study ex-post fairness in the object allocation problem where objects are valuable and commonly o...
Matching with preferences has great potential to coordinate the efficient allocation of scarce resou...
When not all objects are acceptable to all agents, maximizing the number of objects actually assign...
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individually rational assignments. We show that it...
We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem), i.e., the problem of a...
We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem),i.e., the problem of al...
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable outcomes. We show...
We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem), i.e., the problem of a...
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to the...
In unit-demand and multi-copy object allocation problems, we say that a mechanism size-wise dominat...
Inspired by real-world applications such as the assignment of pupils to schools or the allocation of...
I study large random assignment economies with a continuum of agents and a finite number of object t...
Abstract. In the random assignment problem, the probabilistic serial mechanism (Bo-gomolnaia and Mou...
The problem of optimally assigning individuals to heterogeneous objects so that each individual is a...
School districts and other institutions allocating objects without the use of transfers tend to rely...
We study ex-post fairness in the object allocation problem where objects are valuable and commonly o...
Matching with preferences has great potential to coordinate the efficient allocation of scarce resou...