Transcending the functional self : a discourse on the continuity of personhood in degenerative dementia

My interest in studying neurodegenerative models of illness lies primarily in the need to define human personhood over the progressive and often irreversible experience of dementia. Here, I analyze, challenge, and ultimately move beyond purely functional theories of personhood, which are necessarily exclusive in their reduction of the human person to a mere demonstration of capacity (for rationality, self-consciousness, suffering, or otherwise) that is inversely proportional to neuropathology. Bringing to the fore important contributions from both secular philosophical thought and the Abrahamic faith traditions, I argue that functional perspectives neglect the psychosocial, spiritual, and biographical dimensions of personhood, which must be described in reference to both historical and concurrent life experiences. Accounting for these features requires the promotion of social environments that are ideal for the maintenance or preservation of this sense of "person" and calls for the treatment of patients with dementia based on personhood and inherent dignity.My thesis, as an analysis of this debate in the interdisciplinary field of bioethics, brings together philosophy, medicine, law, and the Abrahamic faith traditions to establish guidelines toward a more integrative definition of personhood in the context of the evolving and interactive experiences of degenerative dementia