Identity and difference in Aristotle's theory of perfect friendship

This thesis examines how Aristotle's theory of friendship deals with differences between persons, given that his paradigm case is that of friendship between men who are excellent without qualification. I argue that because of his teleological understanding of human virtue, Aristotle believes that such men will share a comprehensive set of affective and rational apprehensions of the good; true friends will love and understand each other because of their identity in virtue.I establish my interpretation against a rival view, which sees Aristotle as sensitive to the need for attentiveness to and valuation of differences between friends: while I show this latter view to be exegetically untenable, I suggest that it is informed by modern understandings of individual uniqueness which provide the basis for a critique of Aristotle. Finally, I explore the implications of a 'difference' critique of Aristotle for his understanding of the bonds which unite political communities