Pour un pluralisme juridique radical

Firstly, that all normativity constitutes law. Thus, law can no more be defined by formal criteria than it can be conditioned by determinisms. Its substance must be found in the ontology of regulation. All manifestations of normativity must therefore be considered as relevant to the jurist.Secondly, that identity is at once complex, fragmented, interwoven and in flux. We are all inhabited by multiple and often contradictory relationships, allegiances and sensibilities whose overlaps define our identity. It is the constant arbitration with which identity confronts us that predisposes us to develop the empathy necessary to interaction and coexistence.Thirdly, that normativity is a subjective experience that reflects the nature of our identity. The law cannot be viewed as an externality. It can only be actualized through the reciprocal interpellation it implies. The norm is a contested and fragmented space that implies prehension through a reflexive process and retroaction through its inscription within interaction.This thesis explores the foundations and the articulations of norms. Firstly, the study of the sources of legal pluralism reveals the location of radical legal pluralism within a context which called for its emergence. The acknowledgment of the localization of normativity within a complex universe then serves as a foundation for the development of a typology which accounts for the whole scope of the normative domain. It is upon this ontological foundation that we can then acknowledge that the instrumental potential of normative phenomena is overestimated and its symbolic potential is underestimated. This foundation then allows us to contemplate the complexity and the interrelated character of both the emergence and the legitimization of norms. Hence, the mobilization of our shared character as normative agents is the only criterion that can serve as a basis for a radical pluralist conception of law.Radical legal pluralism then represents both a metaphor which describes the wealth of the human condition through the legal experience and an emancipatory heuristic which enables a reappropriation of the law by those who, often without knowing, are its principal crafters