Isaiah Berlin's contribution to liberal theory : pluralism as a romantic response to liberalism

Isaiah Berlin's idea of value pluralism has traditionally been seen as supportive to liberalism. Recently however, the idea of an implicit connection between pluralism and liberalism has been questioned by theorists arguing that there is no theoretical link between both, and that in fact, pluralism presents obstacles to liberalism.In this thesis, I present pluralism as being a romantic response to Enlightenment-inspired liberal theory. My claim is that liberalism, even though it cannot be derived from a pluralist moral theory, provides strong support, both in practice and historically, to our pluralist moral condition. In chapter 1, I explain Berlin's conception of history and the importance of the context. I also contrast pluralism with other liberal theories to lay the foundation of my argument. In chapter 2, I present Berlin's highly original conception of human nature, and his defence of negative liberty. In chapter 3, I demonstrate how pluralism is a romantic response to traditional liberalism by exploring two liberal themes that were both redefined in new terms following the romantic revolt, namely rationality and tolerance. Finally, in chapter 4, I argue that pluralism does not entail liberalism, but that none the less a liberal society is the political arrangement best suited to the fact that human beings disagree about ends, and that values and ways of life are incompatible and incommensurable