Cooperation among adversaries : managing transboundary water disputes in conflict settings

Intrigued by the observation that enduring, task-based water treaties have, surprisingly, emerged within protracted conflict settings that lock the riparians in a deadly embrace, I constructed an interdisciplinary theoretical framework to explain the causes of riparian conflict, and the conditions for riparian conflict resolution. Drawing on the literature from international relations, comparative politics, resource economics and public choice theory, I explain how the constraints posed by ecological forces in a conflict setting, and the political opportunities presented by a particular economic-developmental context shape the decisions of policymakers during the negotiation process that precedes regime emergence.Next, a model is developed that first illustrates the causal pathways among five independent variables, (water scarcity mode, critical environmental threshold, riparian position, state power profile and sustainable development of water resources); three contextual variables, (conflict setting, economic-developmental level, economic-developmental crisis) and the dependent variable of riparian conflict. The pathway is then extended with the addition of two more contextual variables (negotiation structure and strategy) to explain the second dependent variable of regime emergence. Eight hypotheses are then theoretically derived and tested with specifics from four cases covering both developing and developed state riparian conflicts within protracted and non-protracted settings. The Middle East, South Asian, and North American regions are thus studied.It was evident that the degree of water scarcity has either conflict enhancing or conflict mitigating properties depending upon the patterns of interaction among the variables. Both contextual variable clusters had theoretically significant effects on the nature of the regime. I inferred that the state formation dynamic influenced the economic-developmental context in which water policy is formulated and shaped the domestic configuration of water interests. It appears that the influence of rent-seeking groups opposed to a transboundary water treaty wax and wane once critical environmental thresholds, which aggravate or cause an economic-developmental crisis, are exceeded (especially in the most powerful state). This, along with other economic, international and geographic factors, ultimately, alters the preferences of the policymakers to enable compromise at the international level. A state's institutional capacity to adopt a more sustainable water usage pattern is also relevant in this regard