We model how macro-level dynamics of platform competition emerge from micro-level interactions among consumers. We problematize the prevailing winner-take-all hypothesis and argue that instead of assuming that consumers value the general connectivity of an entire network, they are selectively attentive and locally biased. We contrast several alternative agent-based models with differing sets of assumptions regarding consumer agents' behavior and compare their predictions with empirical data from the competition between Sony's PlayStation 3 and Microsoft's Xbox 360. The results show that only when consumers are assumed to be selectively attentive and locally biased is it possible to explain real-life market sharing between the given platform...
Two-sided markets are composed of platform owners and two distinct user networks that either buy or ...
We develop a theoretical model to understand the strategic link between a platform's and developers'...
Consumers purchase multiple types of goods and services, but may be able to examine only a limited n...
Because the literature on platform competition emphasizes the role of network effects, it prescribe...
We introduce within-group external effects in the two-sided singlehoming model of Armstrong (2006). ...
This paper examines online platforms' incentives to protect their users' privacy, when users value t...
This paper studies targeted advertising in two sided markets. Two platforms, with dif-ferent targeti...
This paper examines the dynamic competition between platform firms in two-sided markets with network...
Consumers purchase multiple types of goods and services, but may be able to examine only a limited n...
We show that a two-sided platform can successfully compete by limiting the choice of po-tential matc...
We model digital platforms as attention brokers that have proprietary information about their users'...
In many markets, user benefits depend on participation and usage decisions of other users giving ris...
In this paper, we address how targeting and consumer multi-homing impact platform competition and ma...
This paper examines the dynamic competition between platform firms in two-sided markets with network...
There are examples of entry in two-sided markets, where first entrants occupy a 'central location' a...
Two-sided markets are composed of platform owners and two distinct user networks that either buy or ...
We develop a theoretical model to understand the strategic link between a platform's and developers'...
Consumers purchase multiple types of goods and services, but may be able to examine only a limited n...
Because the literature on platform competition emphasizes the role of network effects, it prescribe...
We introduce within-group external effects in the two-sided singlehoming model of Armstrong (2006). ...
This paper examines online platforms' incentives to protect their users' privacy, when users value t...
This paper studies targeted advertising in two sided markets. Two platforms, with dif-ferent targeti...
This paper examines the dynamic competition between platform firms in two-sided markets with network...
Consumers purchase multiple types of goods and services, but may be able to examine only a limited n...
We show that a two-sided platform can successfully compete by limiting the choice of po-tential matc...
We model digital platforms as attention brokers that have proprietary information about their users'...
In many markets, user benefits depend on participation and usage decisions of other users giving ris...
In this paper, we address how targeting and consumer multi-homing impact platform competition and ma...
This paper examines the dynamic competition between platform firms in two-sided markets with network...
There are examples of entry in two-sided markets, where first entrants occupy a 'central location' a...
Two-sided markets are composed of platform owners and two distinct user networks that either buy or ...
We develop a theoretical model to understand the strategic link between a platform's and developers'...
Consumers purchase multiple types of goods and services, but may be able to examine only a limited n...