Symmetries of games with public and private objectives

If a game is represented as a combination of simpler games, it seems natural to expect a connection between symmetries exhibited by the whole game and by its components. An exact analysis of such a situation is given for games with public and private objectives under additional assumption that the strategy sets are finite and all the players use the same aggregation function, which is strictly increasing in each variable. It turns out that each symmetry of a PP-game comes from symmetries of its components, but the converse need not be true. However, the group of motions of the whole game is determined by the groups of motions of its constituent components. (orig.)Available from TIB Hannover: RN 5363(296) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekSIGLEDEGerman