'This paper considers three linear asymmetric oligopoly models with (1) a representative consumer, (2) horizontal differentiation and (3) vertical differentiation. We show that firms could maximize the joint-profit only based on private and aggregate information. They can choose the 'correct' colluding prices without knowing the demand or profit function. The collusive outcome is a natural focal point despite firms are asymmetric. Collusion can be incentive compatible even though individual actions (prices) are not observed.' (author's abstract)In diesem Beitrag werden drei linear asymmetrische Oligopol-Modelle mit (1) einem repraesentativen Verbraucher, (2) horizontaler Differenzierung und (3) vertikaler Differenzierung untersucht. Es wird...
In an infinitely repeated game where market demand is uncertain and where firms with (possibly asymm...
Cost asymmetry is generally thought to hinder collusion be-cause a more efficient firm has both less...
We explore the effects of asymmetries in capacity constraints on collusion where demand is uncertain...
"Der Beitrag untersucht drei linear asymmetrische Oligopol-Modelle mit (i) einem repräsentativen Ver...
This paper considers three linear asymmetric oligopoly models with (i) a representative consumer, (i...
'This paper studies the incentives and the welfare effect of sharing firm-specific information in as...
Der Schwerpunkt dieser Masterarbeit basiert auf der Untersuchung, auf welche Art und Weisen Firmen ...
In oligopoly models, the symmetric case is special theoretically and neglects asymmetries that may b...
This paper examines optimal incentive schemes for managers, in a Cournot duopoly framework. Under sy...
Using the coefficient of cooperation, we analyse the effect of cost asymmetries on collusive agreeme...
This paper examines optimal incentive schemes for managers, in a Cournot duopoly framework. Under sy...
In an infinitely repeated game where market demand is uncertain and where firms with (possibly asymm...
In an infinitely repeated game where market demand is uncertain and where firms with (possibly asymm...
"We study the incentives of Cournot oligopolists to acquire and disclose information on a common cos...
Collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored when firms\u27 prices are private information and t...
In an infinitely repeated game where market demand is uncertain and where firms with (possibly asymm...
Cost asymmetry is generally thought to hinder collusion be-cause a more efficient firm has both less...
We explore the effects of asymmetries in capacity constraints on collusion where demand is uncertain...
"Der Beitrag untersucht drei linear asymmetrische Oligopol-Modelle mit (i) einem repräsentativen Ver...
This paper considers three linear asymmetric oligopoly models with (i) a representative consumer, (i...
'This paper studies the incentives and the welfare effect of sharing firm-specific information in as...
Der Schwerpunkt dieser Masterarbeit basiert auf der Untersuchung, auf welche Art und Weisen Firmen ...
In oligopoly models, the symmetric case is special theoretically and neglects asymmetries that may b...
This paper examines optimal incentive schemes for managers, in a Cournot duopoly framework. Under sy...
Using the coefficient of cooperation, we analyse the effect of cost asymmetries on collusive agreeme...
This paper examines optimal incentive schemes for managers, in a Cournot duopoly framework. Under sy...
In an infinitely repeated game where market demand is uncertain and where firms with (possibly asymm...
In an infinitely repeated game where market demand is uncertain and where firms with (possibly asymm...
"We study the incentives of Cournot oligopolists to acquire and disclose information on a common cos...
Collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored when firms\u27 prices are private information and t...
In an infinitely repeated game where market demand is uncertain and where firms with (possibly asymm...
Cost asymmetry is generally thought to hinder collusion be-cause a more efficient firm has both less...
We explore the effects of asymmetries in capacity constraints on collusion where demand is uncertain...