Suedosteuropa - Risikobericht

'Die Bandbreite aktueller und potentieller Konflikte in Suedosteuropa reicht von Staatsschwaeche oder -versagen, wirtschaftlichen Disparitaeten und sozialer Deprivation bis hin zu Nationalgeschichte und Konkurrenz um NATO- und EU-Mitgliedschaft. Typischerweise sind Staats- und Nationsbildung nach wie vor die prominentesten Konfliktbereiche in der Region, obwohl die ihnen zugrunde liegenden Konflikte gegebenenfalls viel brisanter sind. Oftmals werden die Konflikte von Parteiinteressen und/ oder wirtschaftlichen Belangen angetrieben, aber im Sinne nationaler Selbstbestimmung und ethnischer Gegensaetze formuliert. Somit erhoehen die gemeinsame Rechtfertigung auf der Basis von Selbstbestimmung (oder Staatssouveraenitaet - als Gegenstueck) und das zugrunde liegende Prinzip des ethnisch-homogenen Nationalstaats die Gefahr der regionalen Eskalation und Praezedenzwirkung. Diese Risiken sind ein inhaerenter Bestandteil des politischen Wechselspiels unter regionalen Akteuren sowie zwischen diesen Akteuren und der internationalen Gemeinschaft, insbesondere der Europaeischen Union.' (Autorenreferat)'Actual and potential conflicts in Southeastern Europe range from weak or failing states, economic disparities and social deprivation to national histories and competition for EU and NATO membership. Typically, nation and state building are still the most prominent conflict areas in the region, although underlying conflicts may be far more potent. More often than not, conflicts are propelled by party interests and/ or economic motives, but couched in terms of national self-determination and ethnic hatred. Therefore, the shared justification of self-determination (or, conversely, state sovereignty) and the underlying notion of the ethnically homogeneous nation-state enhance the danger of regional escalation and precedents. These risks are an inherent part of the political interplay among regional actors as well as between regional actors and the international community, the European Union in particular. The EU agenda of regionalisation and integration requires a certain level of state functionality and political conscientiousness. At the same time, the EU agenda of stabilisation demands that all states and entities be included, in particular those liable to produce instability with regional ramifications. These legacies of the past - unresolved issues or inadequate processes of nation and state building - constrain state functionality and the options of reform oriented politicians, fearing a nationalist backlash. The same legacies also restrict the options for the international community: Full priority for national self-determination would reinvigorate the model of the ethnically homogeneous nation state and inevitably lead to more ethnic strive and state fragmentation. Full priority for the status quo in terms of sovereignty and state structures, however, often impedes state functionality. Many conflicts seem deadlocked with parts of the elites interested in instability rather than constructive arrangements enhancing the functionality of states. In line with the conflicts and crises of Yugoslav disintegration - Croatia and Bosnia (1991-95), Kosovo (1997-99) and Macedonia (2000-01) - the three sub-regions are characterised by different stages in post conflict management as well in nation and state building. The following survey of conflict potentials analyses these three triangles of conflict as separate constellations, while indicating both linkages between the triangles and sub-systems of conflict within states or entities.' (extract)SIGLEAvailable from http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2002/2002 Risiken DEU.pdf <de>; http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2002/2002 Risks ENG.pdf <en> / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman