Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata

Evolutionary stability in extensive 2-person games. Sections 10 to 12

Selten, Reinhard

January 1983

Selten R. Evolutionary stability in extensive 2-person games. Sections 10 to 12. Working Papers. Ins...

EVOLUTIONARY GAMES IN FINITE POPULATIONS

Ornar Rivasplata
Jan Rychtár
Christian Sykes
O. Rivasplata
J. Rychtáf
C. Sykes

October 2016

The classical replicator dynamics for evolutionary games in infinite populations formulated by Taylo...

Some relationships between evolutionary stability criteria in games

Dufwenberg, Martin

January 1997

The relationships between five stability criteria for evolutionary games are studied

Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata

Binmore, Kenneth George
Samuelson, Larry Wayne

January 1991

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-2410...

Evolutionary stability in extensive 2-person games

Selten, R.
Bielefeld Univ. (Germany, F.R.). Inst. fuer Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung

January 1983

SIGLEBibliothek Weltwirtschaft Kiel YY11,509 / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Tech...

Evolutionary stability, strictness and repeated games with common interests

Balkenborg, Dieter

January 1995

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-2410...

Evolutionary stability in asymmetric population games

Balkenborg, Dieter
Schlag, Karl Hermann

January 1995

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-2410...

Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games Correction and further development

Selten, R.
Bonn Univ. (Germany). Sonderforschungsbereich 303 - Information und die Koordination Wirtschaftlicher Aktivitaeten.
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), Bonn (Germany)

January 1986

SIGLETIB: RO 2708 (70) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische Informationsbib...

Dynamic stability in the repeated prisoners' dilemma played by finite automata

Schlag, Karl Hermann

January 1993

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-2410...

Evolutionary stability in the Rubinstein game

Peters, Ralf
Universitaet Hamburg (Germany). Sozialoekonomisches Seminar

January 1995

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-2410...

Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games: correction and further development

Selten, Reinhard

January 1986

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-2410...

Evolutionary stability and cooperation: the infinetly repeated prisoner's dilemma

Peters, Ralf
Universitaet Hamburg (Germany). Sozialoekonomisches Seminar

January 1997

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-2410...

Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces.

Norman, Thomas W

January 2008

Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain ...

Evolutionary Stable Collections in Endogenously Noisy Population of Automata

Xavier Vilày

January 2005

We examine the evolutionary stability of populations of automata, in the context of the Abreu and Ru...

Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces

Norman, Thomas W.L.

Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain ...

Evolutionary stability in extensive 2-person games. Sections 10 to 12

Selten, Reinhard

January 1983

Selten R. Evolutionary stability in extensive 2-person games. Sections 10 to 12. Working Papers. Ins...

EVOLUTIONARY GAMES IN FINITE POPULATIONS

Ornar Rivasplata
Jan Rychtár
Christian Sykes
O. Rivasplata
J. Rychtáf
C. Sykes

October 2016

The classical replicator dynamics for evolutionary games in infinite populations formulated by Taylo...

Some relationships between evolutionary stability criteria in games

Dufwenberg, Martin

January 1997

The relationships between five stability criteria for evolutionary games are studied

Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata

Binmore, Kenneth George
Samuelson, Larry Wayne

January 1991

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-2410...

Evolutionary stability in extensive 2-person games

Selten, R.
Bielefeld Univ. (Germany, F.R.). Inst. fuer Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung

January 1983

SIGLEBibliothek Weltwirtschaft Kiel YY11,509 / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Tech...

Evolutionary stability, strictness and repeated games with common interests

Balkenborg, Dieter

January 1995

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-2410...

Evolutionary stability in asymmetric population games

Balkenborg, Dieter
Schlag, Karl Hermann

January 1995

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-2410...

Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games Correction and further development

Selten, R.
Bonn Univ. (Germany). Sonderforschungsbereich 303 - Information und die Koordination Wirtschaftlicher Aktivitaeten.
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), Bonn (Germany)

January 1986

SIGLETIB: RO 2708 (70) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische Informationsbib...

Dynamic stability in the repeated prisoners' dilemma played by finite automata

Schlag, Karl Hermann

January 1993

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-2410...

Evolutionary stability in the Rubinstein game

Peters, Ralf
Universitaet Hamburg (Germany). Sozialoekonomisches Seminar

January 1995

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-2410...

Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games: correction and further development

Selten, Reinhard

January 1986

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-2410...

Evolutionary stability and cooperation: the infinetly repeated prisoner's dilemma

Peters, Ralf
Universitaet Hamburg (Germany). Sozialoekonomisches Seminar

January 1997

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-2410...

Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces.

Norman, Thomas W

January 2008

Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain ...

Evolutionary Stable Collections in Endogenously Noisy Population of Automata

Xavier Vilày

January 2005

We examine the evolutionary stability of populations of automata, in the context of the Abreu and Ru...

Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces

Norman, Thomas W.L.

Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain ...

Evolutionary stability in extensive 2-person games. Sections 10 to 12

Selten, Reinhard

January 1983

Selten R. Evolutionary stability in extensive 2-person games. Sections 10 to 12. Working Papers. Ins...

EVOLUTIONARY GAMES IN FINITE POPULATIONS

Ornar Rivasplata
Jan Rychtár
Christian Sykes
O. Rivasplata
J. Rychtáf
C. Sykes

October 2016

The classical replicator dynamics for evolutionary games in infinite populations formulated by Taylo...

Some relationships between evolutionary stability criteria in games

Dufwenberg, Martin

January 1997

The relationships between five stability criteria for evolutionary games are studied

Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata

Abstract

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Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata

Abstract

Extracted data

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