Land reform and rural conflict: evidence from 1930s Spain

We use a novel high-frequency, municipality-level dataset to examine the impact of land reform on rural conflict in 1930s Spain, a classical example of property rights reform in a developing economy. We distinguish between types of implementation and consider five types of conflicts: land invasions, peasant strikes, clashes, petty theft and attacks on land owner assets. By performing a differences-indifferences regression analysis, we document three main results. First, overall, land reform only increased the number of reported petty thefts, lasting around two years, followed by a reversion to pre-reform levels. Second, the effects of land reform depend on its implementation. A technical implementation was conducive, if anything, to fewer conflicts (clashes and attacks). In contrast, a more political implementation (which gave, on average, less land per peasant) increased reported petty theft sand, to a lower extent, attacks on owners'assets. Third, we provide suggestive evidence that the fall in income of settlers (the, a priori, benefficiaries) explains the increase in social conflict. Our results highlight the importance of the design and implementation of social policies, especially in the context of an agrarian economy.Basco acknowledges fi nancial support from Catalan Agency for Management of University and Research Grants (2017SGR1301) and Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (PID2019-104723RB-I00). Domenech acknowledges fi nancial support from Spain's Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (PID2019-104869GB-100)