Criminal responsibility for intrusions on the rights of innocent persons : the limits of self-defence, necessity and duress

This thesis is an exploratory study of the boundaries of English and Welsh criminal law where the legally protected personal and proprietary interests of innocent persons are intentionally infringed by another. Despite fulfilling the definitional elements of a criminal offence, there may be circumstances in which the law is prepared to exculpate the actor even where the interests of an innocent person are set back by the conduct. The justifications and excuses to be considered fall predominantly within the province of self-defence, necessity and duress and the correspondence between these respective domains is addressed. The aim is to explore the extent to which the criminal law in a liberal society negates criminal liability for deliberate intrusions on the rights of innocent persons by defining the precise scope of the relevant defences. The innocent persons to be considered fall into three main categories. First, the criminal responsibility of an actor who sets back the interests of an innocent incompetent person in their best interests will be addressed. Next, the liability of a defendant who infringes the rights of an innocent person who poses a threat, unjust or incidental, to the interests of the defendant or another will be analysed. Finally, the criminal responsibility of an actor who violates the rights of an innocent non-threatening bystander in order to stave off a threat to their own interests will be considered. It is argued that in English law the scope of criminal liability for intentional acts which set back the interests of an innocent person is ill-defined. An attempt is made to provide a more consistent philosophical and practical approach to the limits of criminal responsibility in this challenging area of law.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo