This brief reply to McCain and Poston's chapter problematizes both their objections to my chapter on experience justifying belief and their version of epistemological coherentism
This paper examines the role of coherence as a source of epistemic justification, particularly the a...
Abstract. Are there formal coherence constraints governing categorical belief? If so, what are they?...
Things are coherent if they ‘stick together’, are connected in a specific way, and are consistent in...
Among many reasons for which contemporary philosophers take coherentism in epistemology seriously, t...
Can a perceptual experience justify (epistemically) a belief? More generally, can a nonbelief justif...
This study investigates the relationship between coherence and epistemic justification. Part One is ...
Problems for coherentism come in two forms. The fundamental issue that coherentists have not been ve...
In a recent article, Peter Gärdenfors (1992) has suggested that the AGM (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and...
Coherentism in epistemology has long suffered from lack of formal and quantitative explication of th...
An argument is presented which shows that coherence theories of justification are committed to a con...
A common objection to coherence theories of justification comes from belief revision processes: in a...
Perhaps the most fundamental question of epistemology asks on what grounds our knowledge of the worl...
In this paper, I show that Lewis' definition of coherence and Fitelson's and Shogenji's measures of ...
I give a critical overview of the volume, focusing my attention on the chapters that deal with the e...
Earl Conee and Richard Feldman have recently argued that the evidential support relation should be u...
This paper examines the role of coherence as a source of epistemic justification, particularly the a...
Abstract. Are there formal coherence constraints governing categorical belief? If so, what are they?...
Things are coherent if they ‘stick together’, are connected in a specific way, and are consistent in...
Among many reasons for which contemporary philosophers take coherentism in epistemology seriously, t...
Can a perceptual experience justify (epistemically) a belief? More generally, can a nonbelief justif...
This study investigates the relationship between coherence and epistemic justification. Part One is ...
Problems for coherentism come in two forms. The fundamental issue that coherentists have not been ve...
In a recent article, Peter Gärdenfors (1992) has suggested that the AGM (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and...
Coherentism in epistemology has long suffered from lack of formal and quantitative explication of th...
An argument is presented which shows that coherence theories of justification are committed to a con...
A common objection to coherence theories of justification comes from belief revision processes: in a...
Perhaps the most fundamental question of epistemology asks on what grounds our knowledge of the worl...
In this paper, I show that Lewis' definition of coherence and Fitelson's and Shogenji's measures of ...
I give a critical overview of the volume, focusing my attention on the chapters that deal with the e...
Earl Conee and Richard Feldman have recently argued that the evidential support relation should be u...
This paper examines the role of coherence as a source of epistemic justification, particularly the a...
Abstract. Are there formal coherence constraints governing categorical belief? If so, what are they?...
Things are coherent if they ‘stick together’, are connected in a specific way, and are consistent in...