Add to ORKGWe study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice singlepeaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the necessary condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure
AbstractDomains of generalized single-peaked preferences are classified in terms of the extent to wh...
Abstract: We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symme...
We consider social choice problems where different agents can have different sets of admissible sing...
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice singlepeaked preferences. Semilatt...
Abstract: We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich do-main of preferen...
We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich domain of preference profiles...
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where...
We consider domains that exhibit single-peakedness only over a subset of alternatives. We call such ...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] This ...
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric singl...
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric singl...
We characterize all domains on which (i) every unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function i...
We generalize the traditional concept of single-peaked preference domains in two ways. First, we int...
This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing pre...
A social choice function satisfies the tops-only property if the chosen alternative only depends on ...
AbstractDomains of generalized single-peaked preferences are classified in terms of the extent to wh...
Abstract: We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symme...
We consider social choice problems where different agents can have different sets of admissible sing...
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice singlepeaked preferences. Semilatt...
Abstract: We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich do-main of preferen...
We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich domain of preference profiles...
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where...
We consider domains that exhibit single-peakedness only over a subset of alternatives. We call such ...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] This ...
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric singl...
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric singl...
We characterize all domains on which (i) every unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function i...
We generalize the traditional concept of single-peaked preference domains in two ways. First, we int...
This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing pre...
A social choice function satisfies the tops-only property if the chosen alternative only depends on ...
AbstractDomains of generalized single-peaked preferences are classified in terms of the extent to wh...
Abstract: We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symme...
We consider social choice problems where different agents can have different sets of admissible sing...