Add to ORKGIn this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Özkal-Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in matching problems with endowments. We characterize the classes of consumption rules under which optimal matching rules can be manipulated via predonation of endowment
We study the problem of matching bidders to items where each bidder i has a general, strictly monoto...
Is the Pareto optimality of matching mechanisms robust to the introduction of boundedly rational beh...
In this paper we show that in an exchange economy with quasi-linear preferences it is possible to ma...
In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Özkal-Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of ...
In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optima...
Hatfield and Milgrom [Hatfield, John William, Milgrom, Paul R., 2005. Matching with contracts. Amer....
We want to match (order) ideals of posets P and Q with respect to a relation that associates with ev...
a b s t r a c t We study the problem of matching bidders to items where each bidder i has general, s...
We study the problem of matching bidders to items where each bidder i has general, strictly monotoni...
Abstract: The Blocking Lemma identi\u85es a particular blocking pair for each non-stable and individ...
In two-sided matching problems, we formulate (i) a concept of eq-uity of matchings based on envy min...
In two-sided matching problems, we formulate (i) a concept of eq-uity of matchings based on envy min...
In two-sided matching problems, we formulate (i) a concept of equity of matchings based on envy mini...
In this paper we show that it is possible to manipulate market equilibria in an economy with profit ...
We thank participants of seminars at the Universities of Salamanca, Valencia, Osaka, Waseda, East An...
We study the problem of matching bidders to items where each bidder i has a general, strictly monoto...
Is the Pareto optimality of matching mechanisms robust to the introduction of boundedly rational beh...
In this paper we show that in an exchange economy with quasi-linear preferences it is possible to ma...
In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Özkal-Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of ...
In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optima...
Hatfield and Milgrom [Hatfield, John William, Milgrom, Paul R., 2005. Matching with contracts. Amer....
We want to match (order) ideals of posets P and Q with respect to a relation that associates with ev...
a b s t r a c t We study the problem of matching bidders to items where each bidder i has general, s...
We study the problem of matching bidders to items where each bidder i has general, strictly monotoni...
Abstract: The Blocking Lemma identi\u85es a particular blocking pair for each non-stable and individ...
In two-sided matching problems, we formulate (i) a concept of eq-uity of matchings based on envy min...
In two-sided matching problems, we formulate (i) a concept of eq-uity of matchings based on envy min...
In two-sided matching problems, we formulate (i) a concept of equity of matchings based on envy mini...
In this paper we show that it is possible to manipulate market equilibria in an economy with profit ...
We thank participants of seminars at the Universities of Salamanca, Valencia, Osaka, Waseda, East An...
We study the problem of matching bidders to items where each bidder i has a general, strictly monoto...
Is the Pareto optimality of matching mechanisms robust to the introduction of boundedly rational beh...
In this paper we show that in an exchange economy with quasi-linear preferences it is possible to ma...