Financial support from ECO2009-07616, 2009SGR-169, Consolider-Ingenio CSD2006-00016, Barcelona Economics-Xarxa CREA and ICREA AcademiaIn this paper, we provide further support for the family of average values for games with externalities defined in Macho-Stadler et al. (J Econ Theory 135:339-356, 2007). This is a large family of values that includes several recent proposals. We show that they can be constructed through the sharing of appropriately defined dividends. Furthermore, we show the flexibility of this approach by using it to generate non-symmetric values
We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are pres...
We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coaliti...
Until recently, computational aspects of the Shapley value were only studied under the assumption th...
In this paper, we provide further support for the family of average values for games with externalit...
Financial support from ECO2009-07616, 2009SGR-169, Consolider-Ingenio CSD2006-00016, Barcelona Econo...
We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provi...
For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the conc...
This paper analyzes two specific economic problems: The division of profits between associated firms...
The concept of dividend of a coalition introduced by Harsanyi in 1959 within the framework of transf...
For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the conc...
This paper analyzes two specific economic problems: The division of profits between associated firms...
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents gener...
Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This...
International audienceEndogenous sharing rules were introduced by Simon and Zame (Econometrica 58(4)...
We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are pres...
We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coaliti...
Until recently, computational aspects of the Shapley value were only studied under the assumption th...
In this paper, we provide further support for the family of average values for games with externalit...
Financial support from ECO2009-07616, 2009SGR-169, Consolider-Ingenio CSD2006-00016, Barcelona Econo...
We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provi...
For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the conc...
This paper analyzes two specific economic problems: The division of profits between associated firms...
The concept of dividend of a coalition introduced by Harsanyi in 1959 within the framework of transf...
For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the conc...
This paper analyzes two specific economic problems: The division of profits between associated firms...
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents gener...
Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This...
International audienceEndogenous sharing rules were introduced by Simon and Zame (Econometrica 58(4)...
We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are pres...
We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coaliti...
Until recently, computational aspects of the Shapley value were only studied under the assumption th...