Add to ORKGWe analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via so-called agent-k-linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of strategic agents...
International audienceDistributed mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods are mechanisms lacking...
The fair division of indivisible goods has long been an important topic in economics and, more recen...
We consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents co...
We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents ...
We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivis...
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount ...
This paper studies envy-free allocations for economies with indivisible objects, quasi-linear utilit...
In this paper we study the strategic aspects of the No-Envy solution for the problem of allocating a...
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivis-ible goods to a set of people from an alg...
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount ...
In this paper, we study the problem of matching a set of items to a set of agents partitioned into t...
One must allocate a finite set of indivisible goods among two agents without monetary compensation. ...
International audienceIn this paper, we study the problem of matching a set of items to a set of age...
We study the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive utilities. It i...
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of strategic agents...
International audienceDistributed mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods are mechanisms lacking...
The fair division of indivisible goods has long been an important topic in economics and, more recen...
We consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents co...
We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents ...
We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivis...
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount ...
This paper studies envy-free allocations for economies with indivisible objects, quasi-linear utilit...
In this paper we study the strategic aspects of the No-Envy solution for the problem of allocating a...
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivis-ible goods to a set of people from an alg...
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount ...
In this paper, we study the problem of matching a set of items to a set of agents partitioned into t...
One must allocate a finite set of indivisible goods among two agents without monetary compensation. ...
International audienceIn this paper, we study the problem of matching a set of items to a set of age...
We study the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive utilities. It i...
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of strategic agents...
International audienceDistributed mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods are mechanisms lacking...
The fair division of indivisible goods has long been an important topic in economics and, more recen...