Die Wissenschaftstheorie und die Physik - Diagnose und Analyse eines Missverständnisses, sowie Konklusionen in Betreff Biologie und Epistemologie

Philosophy of science is basically a paradoxical endeavor. For, notwithstanding the fact that the phenomenon of cognition (along with life and consciousness) is still considered a great unsolved riddle of science, the philosophy of science, for its part, applies an epistemological yardstick to science. No less than the yardstick of the certainty of knowledge. Now the application of this criterion makes sense only under the condition that the underlying knowledge of cognition is beyond question, and from this automatically arises the question of what kind this knowledge is. The analysis of this knowledge leads to the conclusion that it is mere, albeit deeply rooted, "metaphysical" convictions. In fact, insofar as it is supposed to form the legitimating basis for empirical (scientific) knowledge, it is clear from the outset that, for logical reasons alone, it cannot itself be empirical, because that would lead to an infinite regress. In the context of philosophy of science, the yardstick of certainty of knowledge, which is based on these convictions, acquires an additional function, namely that of the criterion of 'scientificity' (or of the 'demarcation' between physics and 'mere metaphysics'). Thus, the very convictions that form the 'metaphysical foundation' of epistemology enter into the interpretation of physics as a science, leading to a fundamental misunderstanding that manifests itself in the interpretation of physical concepts by analogy with metaphysical (object-related) terms and, consequently, in a 'descriptive' understanding of physics' heuristic approach to objects. In short, our (naïve) understanding of cognition is as such metaphysically 'preloaded', and this preload is transferred via epistemology, completely inconspicuously, also to the understanding of physics. The way to an adequate understanding of the physical concepts will be pointed out by the analysis of that kind of epistemic certainty which is actually inherent in physics, independent of espistemological convictions, and which is of a quite different kind than the philosophy of science assumes. While this is primarily a matter of purely epistemological concerns, only their clarification will also enable an understanding of the originary ontological significance of the physical concepts, and thus a real understanding of the significance of physics as a foundational science, also for other fields, especially biology