Dependency of 'a Subjective Succession' of Perceptions : Kant's Theory of Causality and His Criticism against Hume

The purpose of this paper is to examine a characteristic of Kant's theory of causality and to demonstrate a status of 'a subjective succession' of perceptions in his theory. A characteristic of Kant's theory of causality is the following: causality is regarded as a frame of our logical thoughts. In detail, according to him, our recognition about causal relations is realized through the imposition of a causality-category upon 'a subjective succession' of perceptions. One interpretation of this view can be understood more clearly when we compare this argument with Hume's theory of causality. In this paper, first I examine Kant's criticism against Hume in 'the Transcendental Doctrine of Methods' of Critique of Pure Reason, and clarify the difference between their basic structures by paying attention to Kant's concept of 'possible experience'. Second, I probe Kant's argument in the chapter on 'second analogy' of experience and consider his views about the meaning of 'occurring' of events. Thus, finally I demonstrate the dependency of 'a subjective succession' of perceptions upon 'an objective succe ssion'