Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strat...
We prove that if n individuals start with the same prior over a probability space, and then each obs...
In this chapter I argue for cross-disciplinary perspectives on how we think about and manage informa...
International audiencePurpose - In games with strategic complementarities, public information about ...
Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, ...
When states of the world are normally distributed, the sequential exchange and revision of beliefs c...
For as long as there have been theories about common knowledge, they have been exposed to a certain ...
While the role of mutual beliefs in coordination and collaboration has been extensively acknowledged...
We propose and experimentally test two tractable methods to incentivize the elicitation of private i...
This paper discusses the motivation behind common knowledge. Common knowledge has been argued to be ...
Little is known about how groups use their most precious commodity: information held by group member...
An influential tradition holds that thoughts are public: different thinkers share many of their thou...
McKelvey and Page [1986] investigate the effect that common knowledge of an aggregate statistic of i...
International audienceWe present two logics of collective belief with a semantics exploiting the not...
Members of di¤erent social groups often hold widely divergent public beliefs regarding the nature of...
I show how improper conditioning of beliefs can lead to under-contribution in public goods environme...
We prove that if n individuals start with the same prior over a probability space, and then each obs...
In this chapter I argue for cross-disciplinary perspectives on how we think about and manage informa...
International audiencePurpose - In games with strategic complementarities, public information about ...
Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, ...
When states of the world are normally distributed, the sequential exchange and revision of beliefs c...
For as long as there have been theories about common knowledge, they have been exposed to a certain ...
While the role of mutual beliefs in coordination and collaboration has been extensively acknowledged...
We propose and experimentally test two tractable methods to incentivize the elicitation of private i...
This paper discusses the motivation behind common knowledge. Common knowledge has been argued to be ...
Little is known about how groups use their most precious commodity: information held by group member...
An influential tradition holds that thoughts are public: different thinkers share many of their thou...
McKelvey and Page [1986] investigate the effect that common knowledge of an aggregate statistic of i...
International audienceWe present two logics of collective belief with a semantics exploiting the not...
Members of di¤erent social groups often hold widely divergent public beliefs regarding the nature of...
I show how improper conditioning of beliefs can lead to under-contribution in public goods environme...
We prove that if n individuals start with the same prior over a probability space, and then each obs...
In this chapter I argue for cross-disciplinary perspectives on how we think about and manage informa...
International audiencePurpose - In games with strategic complementarities, public information about ...