This paper adopts an innovative approach for evaluating the adequacy of a Deposit Insurance Schemes (henceforth DIS) funds in a context where banks comply the Basel 2 framework. We estimate DIS loss distributions by means of Monte Carlo simulations, following a methodology that focuses on the part of banks' credit risks non already covered by the Basel 2 capital requirements for banks. We also take account of contagion risk across banks. We argue that existing approaches that assess DIS funds adequacy produce results that do not properly take into account the interaction that exists between the two pillars of banking prudential regulation - deposit insurance and capital requirements - with the consequence a distorted or incoherent assessmen...
The pricing of bank deposit insurance is the starting point in understanding how the design of a dep...
The last financial crisis has shown that large banking crises pose a highly dangerous risk to both t...
The last financial crisis has shown that large banking crises pose a highly dangerous risk to both t...
This paper extends the existing literature on deposit insurance by proposing a new approach for the ...
This paper extends the existing literature on deposit insurance by proposing a new approach for the ...
Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGSs) are financial institutions whose main aim is to provide a safety ne...
This paper discusses a deposit insurance model recently developed by De Lisa et al. (2010), highligh...
Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGSs) are institutions whose main aim is to provide a safety net for depo...
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has recently tested credit risk models used by lar...
This paper discusses a deposit insurance model recently developed by De Lisa et al. (2010), highligh...
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has recently tested credit risk measurement models ...
Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGSs) are financial institutions whose main aim is to provide a safety ne...
To promote financial stability through protecting individual depositors, more than seventy countries...
The first part of this paper is dedicated to different methods of managing market, operational and c...
The last financial crisis has demonstrated that large banking crises pose a highly dangerous risk t...
The pricing of bank deposit insurance is the starting point in understanding how the design of a dep...
The last financial crisis has shown that large banking crises pose a highly dangerous risk to both t...
The last financial crisis has shown that large banking crises pose a highly dangerous risk to both t...
This paper extends the existing literature on deposit insurance by proposing a new approach for the ...
This paper extends the existing literature on deposit insurance by proposing a new approach for the ...
Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGSs) are financial institutions whose main aim is to provide a safety ne...
This paper discusses a deposit insurance model recently developed by De Lisa et al. (2010), highligh...
Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGSs) are institutions whose main aim is to provide a safety net for depo...
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has recently tested credit risk models used by lar...
This paper discusses a deposit insurance model recently developed by De Lisa et al. (2010), highligh...
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has recently tested credit risk measurement models ...
Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGSs) are financial institutions whose main aim is to provide a safety ne...
To promote financial stability through protecting individual depositors, more than seventy countries...
The first part of this paper is dedicated to different methods of managing market, operational and c...
The last financial crisis has demonstrated that large banking crises pose a highly dangerous risk t...
The pricing of bank deposit insurance is the starting point in understanding how the design of a dep...
The last financial crisis has shown that large banking crises pose a highly dangerous risk to both t...
The last financial crisis has shown that large banking crises pose a highly dangerous risk to both t...