We study the Maximum Weighted Matching problem in a partial information setting where the agents' utilities for being matched to other agents are hidden and the mechanism only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is motivated by the fact that in many settings, agents cannot express the numerical values of their utility for different outcomes, but are still able to rank the outcomes in their order of preference. Specifically, we study problems where the ground truth exists in the form of a weighted graph, and look to design algorithms that approximate the true optimum matching using only the preference orderings for each agent (induced by the hidden weights) as input. If no restrictions are placed on the weights, then one ...
The traditional model of two-sided matching assumes that all agents fully know their own preferences...
We consider the one-sided matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these ...
We consider the One-Sided Matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these ...
We study Matching, Clustering, and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agen...
We consider ordinal approximation algorithms for a broad class of utility maximization problems for ...
We study the problem of approximate social welfare maximization (without money) in onesided matching...
We study the problem of approximate social welfare maximization (without money) in one-sided matchin...
Motivated by the fact that in several cases a matching in a graph is stable if and only if it is pro...
Motivated by the fact that in several cases a matching in a graph is stable if and only if it is pro...
In most social choice settings, the participating agents are typically required to express their pre...
Traditionally, optimization problems in operations research have been studied in a complete informat...
Wattenhofer et al. [WW04] derive a complicated distributed algorithm to compute a weighted matching ...
I study several graph problems in which the information of the given graphs are incomplete. I devise...
The secretary problem is a classic model for online decision making. Recently, combinatorial extensi...
The secretary problem is a classic model for online decision making. Recently, combinatorial extensi...
The traditional model of two-sided matching assumes that all agents fully know their own preferences...
We consider the one-sided matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these ...
We consider the One-Sided Matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these ...
We study Matching, Clustering, and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agen...
We consider ordinal approximation algorithms for a broad class of utility maximization problems for ...
We study the problem of approximate social welfare maximization (without money) in onesided matching...
We study the problem of approximate social welfare maximization (without money) in one-sided matchin...
Motivated by the fact that in several cases a matching in a graph is stable if and only if it is pro...
Motivated by the fact that in several cases a matching in a graph is stable if and only if it is pro...
In most social choice settings, the participating agents are typically required to express their pre...
Traditionally, optimization problems in operations research have been studied in a complete informat...
Wattenhofer et al. [WW04] derive a complicated distributed algorithm to compute a weighted matching ...
I study several graph problems in which the information of the given graphs are incomplete. I devise...
The secretary problem is a classic model for online decision making. Recently, combinatorial extensi...
The secretary problem is a classic model for online decision making. Recently, combinatorial extensi...
The traditional model of two-sided matching assumes that all agents fully know their own preferences...
We consider the one-sided matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these ...
We consider the One-Sided Matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these ...