Add to ORKGWe consider approval-based committee voting, i.e., the setting where each voter approves a subset of candidates, and these votes are then used to select a fixed-size set of winners (committee). We propose a natural axiom for this setting, which we call justified representation (JR). This axiom requires that if a large enough group of voters exhibits agree- ment by supporting the same candidate, then at least one voter in this group has an approved candidate in the winning committee. We show that for every list of ballots it is possible to select a committee that provides JR. We then check if this axiom is fulfilled by well-known approval-based voting rules. We show that the answer is negative for most of the rules we consider, with notable ...
In the apportionment problem, a fixed number of seats must be distributed among parties in proportio...
We propose a new class of voting rules, called Size Approval Voting. According to this rule, the eff...
Suppose that a group of voters wants to select k 1 alternatives from a given set, and each voter ind...
We consider approval-based committee voting, i.e., the set-ting where each voter approves a subset o...
We consider approval-based committee voting, i.e. the setting where each voter approves a subset of ...
The goal of multi-winner elections is to choose a fixed-size committee based on voters’ preferences....
The goal of multi-winner elections is to choose a fixed-size committee based on voters’ preferences....
Proceedings of 10th Multidisciplinary Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling (MPREF) in conjunc...
We consider the problem of selecting a fixed-size committee based on approval ballots. It is desirab...
A new voting rule for electing committees is described. Specifically, we use approval balloting and ...
In the apportionment problem, a fixed number of seats must be distributed among parties in proportio...
We propose a new class of voting rules, called Size Approval Voting. According to this rule, the efe...
Abstract Approval balloting is applied to the problem of electing a representative com-mittee. We de...
We prove axiomatic characterizations of several important multiwinner rules within the class of appr...
We propose a new class of voting rules, called Size Approval Voting. According to this rule, the eff...
In the apportionment problem, a fixed number of seats must be distributed among parties in proportio...
We propose a new class of voting rules, called Size Approval Voting. According to this rule, the eff...
Suppose that a group of voters wants to select k 1 alternatives from a given set, and each voter ind...
We consider approval-based committee voting, i.e., the set-ting where each voter approves a subset o...
We consider approval-based committee voting, i.e. the setting where each voter approves a subset of ...
The goal of multi-winner elections is to choose a fixed-size committee based on voters’ preferences....
The goal of multi-winner elections is to choose a fixed-size committee based on voters’ preferences....
Proceedings of 10th Multidisciplinary Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling (MPREF) in conjunc...
We consider the problem of selecting a fixed-size committee based on approval ballots. It is desirab...
A new voting rule for electing committees is described. Specifically, we use approval balloting and ...
In the apportionment problem, a fixed number of seats must be distributed among parties in proportio...
We propose a new class of voting rules, called Size Approval Voting. According to this rule, the efe...
Abstract Approval balloting is applied to the problem of electing a representative com-mittee. We de...
We prove axiomatic characterizations of several important multiwinner rules within the class of appr...
We propose a new class of voting rules, called Size Approval Voting. According to this rule, the eff...
In the apportionment problem, a fixed number of seats must be distributed among parties in proportio...
We propose a new class of voting rules, called Size Approval Voting. According to this rule, the eff...
Suppose that a group of voters wants to select k 1 alternatives from a given set, and each voter ind...