Motivated by applications to crowdsourcing, we study voting rules that output a correct ranking of alternatives by quality from a large collection of noisy input rankings. We seek voting rules that are supremely robust to noise, in the sense of being correct in the face of any "reasonable" type of noise. We show that there is such a voting rule, which we call the modal ranking rule. Moreover, we establish that the modal ranking rule is the unique rule with the preceding robustness property within a large family of voting rules, which includes a slew of well-studied rules
We show that simple majority rule satisfies four standard and attractive properties—the Pareto prope...
Approval voting allows voters to list any number of candidates. Their scores are obtained by summing...
In many practical situations, we need to make a group decision that takes into account preferences o...
Motivated by applications to crowdsourcing, we study voting rules that output a correct ranking of a...
Motivated by applications to crowdsourcing, we study voting rules that output a correct ranking of a...
A well-studied approach to the design of voting rules views them as maximum likelihood estimators; g...
A well-studied approach to the design of voting rules views them as maximum likelihood estimators; g...
We present the first model of optimal voting under adversar-ial noise. From this viewpoint, voting r...
Voting is a very general method of preference aggregation. A voting rule takes as input every voter'...
Voting is a very general method of preference aggregation. A voting rule takes as input ev-ery voter...
This paper proposes normative consequentialist criteria for voting rules under Knightian uncertainty...
In an election held in a noisy environment, agents may unintentionally perturb the outcome by commun...
Maximum likelihood estimation furnishes powerful insights into voting theory, and the design of voti...
We explore the relationship between two approaches to rationalizing voting rules: the maximum likeli...
While the study of election theory is not a new field in and of itself, recent research has applied ...
We show that simple majority rule satisfies four standard and attractive properties—the Pareto prope...
Approval voting allows voters to list any number of candidates. Their scores are obtained by summing...
In many practical situations, we need to make a group decision that takes into account preferences o...
Motivated by applications to crowdsourcing, we study voting rules that output a correct ranking of a...
Motivated by applications to crowdsourcing, we study voting rules that output a correct ranking of a...
A well-studied approach to the design of voting rules views them as maximum likelihood estimators; g...
A well-studied approach to the design of voting rules views them as maximum likelihood estimators; g...
We present the first model of optimal voting under adversar-ial noise. From this viewpoint, voting r...
Voting is a very general method of preference aggregation. A voting rule takes as input every voter'...
Voting is a very general method of preference aggregation. A voting rule takes as input ev-ery voter...
This paper proposes normative consequentialist criteria for voting rules under Knightian uncertainty...
In an election held in a noisy environment, agents may unintentionally perturb the outcome by commun...
Maximum likelihood estimation furnishes powerful insights into voting theory, and the design of voti...
We explore the relationship between two approaches to rationalizing voting rules: the maximum likeli...
While the study of election theory is not a new field in and of itself, recent research has applied ...
We show that simple majority rule satisfies four standard and attractive properties—the Pareto prope...
Approval voting allows voters to list any number of candidates. Their scores are obtained by summing...
In many practical situations, we need to make a group decision that takes into account preferences o...