The Transylvaniya Problem in the USSR with Its Anti-Hitler Coalition Allies (June 1941 - May 1943) (Anatoly Salkov)

Раздел - "Международные отношения"After the beginning of Soviet-German war issues connected with Romania and Hungary took a significant place in the USSR relations with Great Britain and the USA. Firstly, the USSR urged its allies to declare war on Germany's satellites, which had not been done until December 1941. Secondly, the issue of borders in the Carpathians-Danube region was very acute, including the recognition of the new Soviet border. Thirdly, the discussion of the scenarios of the post-war order in Central and South-Central Europe began. An important step in the solution of these problems was the Foreign Minister A. Eden's visit to Moscow in December 16—20, 1941 and the discussion of the general plan of European borders reorganization put forward by J. Stalin. Other steps included an unproductive attempt to start the planning for the post-war period in December of 1941—January of 1941, the establishment of the Commission on Peace Treaties and Post-war Settlement at the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (the Litvinov Commission) in August 1943, the development of vast Soviet concepts of the post-war settlement and national and territorial changes in October 1943 (the Dekanozov memorandum) and in January 1944 (the Maisky Memorandum). The Transylvania issue which was the subject-matter of the Hungary-Romania territorial debate involving the interests of all warring countries played an important role in these events, documents and concepts. Beginning with 1942 the liberal opposition both in Romania and Hungary seeked a reserve option in case of Germany's defeat so as to decide the Transylvania question in their favour. Romania gained a major advantage in this respect after the coup d'etat of August 23, 1944 and the declaration ofwar on Germany. Starting with June 1944 the Litvinov Commission worked at the assessment of historical and ethnic arguments for the right to possess Transylvania. Four possible variants of the solution of the problem were developed: 1) leave the situation as it was, meaning the recognition of the second Vienna Arbitration decision from August 30, 1940, which was politically impossible; 2) give the province to Hungary, which was out of the question but "not quite"; 3) give the province to Romania in exchange for a strong guarantee of close and lasting cooperation with the USSR; 4) establish an independent Transylvania state, to which most of the Litvinov Commission inclined. On September 12, 1944 Romania concluded an armistice agreement, Article 19 of which provided that the Allies considered the Vienna Arbitration null and void and "agreed on Transylvania (or its most part) to be returned to Romania". This clause contained a possibility for a scheme which permitted Moscow to successfully play the Transylvania card: as a result of two visits of A. Vyshinsky to Bukharest in November-December 1944 and February—March 1945 the USSR was active in the development of two government crises and guaranteed the formation of the pro-Communist cabinet of P. Groza on March 6, 1945. Bucharest's award was Northern Transylvania which had been lost in 1940. By this Moscow achieved the set of decisions on Transylvania issue which secured Soviet political and ideological interests. The content of these decisions and their implementation mechanism were the subject of debate at various levels for the next 3 years but they remained practically the same