This chapter discusses what I call the ‘Existentialist Fallacy,’ that the process of our normative self-constitution is something to be undertaken ex nihilo, right now, from a standing start. I argue that this is indeed a fallacy. It isn’t like that, and it can’t be. The project of making our normative world is a collective enterprise, one we inherit and pass on. It should not be understood in an individualistic spirit. This is a point that might seem to weigh against understandings of the normative that are deflationary and Humean in spirit, but I argue that that too is an error and there is no tension between these things
We are subject to many different norms telling us how to act, from moral norms to etiquette rules an...
A reply to Jimmy Lenman’s “Scanlon’s Normative Realism” delivered at Reasonable Questioning: Scanlon...
The paper considers the main arguments against the possibility that basic normative principles can c...
Ridge defends a form of hybrid expressivism where normative judgements are constituted by two elemen...
Do moral norms invariably supply agents with reasons? Does the dedicated immoralist necessarily have...
A powerful objection against moral conventionalism says that it gives the wrong reasons for individu...
Andy Egan objects to quasi-realism that quasi-realists are committed to a form of smugness: when con...
I argue against the claim that we should adopt a moral error theory. The intelligibility of our mora...
I defend normative subjectivism against the charge that believing in it undermines the functional ro...
If, as expressivists maintain, the function of normative thought and talk is not to represent or des...
We are fallible, and knowledge of our fallibility has normative implications. But these normative im...
In this thesis I present a challenge to anyone who continues to engage in moral thinking – that is t...
I argue that certain species of belief, such as mathematical, logical, and normative beliefs, are in...
There is a puzzle about Hume's is-ought gap involving an epistemic `ought'. From the premise `Snow ...
In this paper, I argue that David Hume's is-ought problem stems from morality as a simplifying frame...
We are subject to many different norms telling us how to act, from moral norms to etiquette rules an...
A reply to Jimmy Lenman’s “Scanlon’s Normative Realism” delivered at Reasonable Questioning: Scanlon...
The paper considers the main arguments against the possibility that basic normative principles can c...
Ridge defends a form of hybrid expressivism where normative judgements are constituted by two elemen...
Do moral norms invariably supply agents with reasons? Does the dedicated immoralist necessarily have...
A powerful objection against moral conventionalism says that it gives the wrong reasons for individu...
Andy Egan objects to quasi-realism that quasi-realists are committed to a form of smugness: when con...
I argue against the claim that we should adopt a moral error theory. The intelligibility of our mora...
I defend normative subjectivism against the charge that believing in it undermines the functional ro...
If, as expressivists maintain, the function of normative thought and talk is not to represent or des...
We are fallible, and knowledge of our fallibility has normative implications. But these normative im...
In this thesis I present a challenge to anyone who continues to engage in moral thinking – that is t...
I argue that certain species of belief, such as mathematical, logical, and normative beliefs, are in...
There is a puzzle about Hume's is-ought gap involving an epistemic `ought'. From the premise `Snow ...
In this paper, I argue that David Hume's is-ought problem stems from morality as a simplifying frame...
We are subject to many different norms telling us how to act, from moral norms to etiquette rules an...
A reply to Jimmy Lenman’s “Scanlon’s Normative Realism” delivered at Reasonable Questioning: Scanlon...
The paper considers the main arguments against the possibility that basic normative principles can c...