Add to ORKGDamage compensation claims in case of cartels are supposed to increase deterrence, compensate losses and increase efficiency. I show that such claims can instead have adverse effects: If suppliers or buyers of cartelists are compensated in proportion to the profits lost due to the cartel, expected cartel profits can increase. Claims of downstream firms against upstream cartelists who do not monopolize the market increase consumer prices. Suppliers of cartelists can be worse off when eligible to compensation. These results apply also to abuses of dominance and call for a more careful approach towards the private enforcement of competition law
This paper examines cartel overcharges for the European market. Using a sample of 191 overcharge es...
This paper develops a model of the birth and death of cartels in the presence of enforcement activit...
The paper focuses on the various methods used to quantify cartel damages, which have become more and...
While private actions for damages by customers against price-cartels receive much attention, the tre...
We develop a general economic framework for computing cartel damages claims by purchaser plaintiffs....
Cartel damage occurs in many different shapes. Actors that are beyond doubt heavily affected by a ca...
We develop a general framework for computing cartel damages claims. We decom-pose a direct purchaser...
During the last ten years there has been a rigorous debate on how to improve anti-cartel enforcement...
The paper studies the assessment of private damages that the cartelization of a market imposes on bu...
In many countries antitrust enforcement by Competition Authorities through prosecution and the impos...
We use consumer panel data to calculate the damage suffered by German consumers due to a detergent ...
This paper presents a rare attempt to quantify the deterrent effect of anti-cartel policy. It develo...
The focus of cartel damages law is on the recovery of the cartel overcharge. Parties other than purc...
In many countries antitrust enforcement by Competition Authorities through prosecution and the impos...
Damage actions may reduce leniency programs’ attractiveness for cartel participants if their coopera...
This paper examines cartel overcharges for the European market. Using a sample of 191 overcharge es...
This paper develops a model of the birth and death of cartels in the presence of enforcement activit...
The paper focuses on the various methods used to quantify cartel damages, which have become more and...
While private actions for damages by customers against price-cartels receive much attention, the tre...
We develop a general economic framework for computing cartel damages claims by purchaser plaintiffs....
Cartel damage occurs in many different shapes. Actors that are beyond doubt heavily affected by a ca...
We develop a general framework for computing cartel damages claims. We decom-pose a direct purchaser...
During the last ten years there has been a rigorous debate on how to improve anti-cartel enforcement...
The paper studies the assessment of private damages that the cartelization of a market imposes on bu...
In many countries antitrust enforcement by Competition Authorities through prosecution and the impos...
We use consumer panel data to calculate the damage suffered by German consumers due to a detergent ...
This paper presents a rare attempt to quantify the deterrent effect of anti-cartel policy. It develo...
The focus of cartel damages law is on the recovery of the cartel overcharge. Parties other than purc...
In many countries antitrust enforcement by Competition Authorities through prosecution and the impos...
Damage actions may reduce leniency programs’ attractiveness for cartel participants if their coopera...
This paper examines cartel overcharges for the European market. Using a sample of 191 overcharge es...
This paper develops a model of the birth and death of cartels in the presence of enforcement activit...
The paper focuses on the various methods used to quantify cartel damages, which have become more and...