A resource view and a social exchange view on leader-member dynamics: a meta-analysis of LMX and a study ofsupervisor monitoring influencing subordinate innovation

This dissertation contains two studies. The first study uses a resource-based view to update previous meta-analyses of leader-member exchange (LMX) (Gerstner & Day, 1997; Ilies, Nahrgang, & Morgeson, 2007) by meta-analyzing the relationships between LMX and its various antecedents and outcomes. Based on the conservation of resources (COR) theory, LMX is regarded as a valuable resource toward multiple performance outcomes. Four groups of antecedents are proposed and it is argued that these resources help to develop a high quality of LMX, which represents the “resource gain” process in COR theory. Hypotheses relating to relationships between LMX and its correlates were proposed and tested. Methodological moderators were also included. Overall, results show that LMX is significantly related to various antecedents and outcomes. Implications for theory development and directions for future research are discussed. Based on the findings and research gaps observed from the first study, the second study uses a social-exchange view to propose and test a model of supervisor monitoring influencing subordinate innovation. It introduces a new and parsimonious classification of supervisor monitoring (control monitoring and developmental monitoring) and examines the effects of these two monitoring behaviors on subordinates’ innovative behaviors (generating, spreading, and implementing new ideas). Guided by the social exchange theory, this study argues that the two types of supervisor monitoring would affect subordinates’ job attitudes (trust and distrust in supervisor), social relationship quality (leader-member exchange), and work behaviors (feedback seeking behaviors), which in turn affect their innovative behaviors. Data were collected from 388 supervisor-subordinate dyads in China. Results show support for the proposed theoretical model. Findings suggest that supervisors’ monitoring behaviors have both positive and negative effects on subordinates’ innovations, depending on the kind of monitoring behavior they display.published_or_final_versionBusinessDoctoralDoctor of Philosoph