Discovering multiple resource holders in query-incentive networks

Session - Content Distribution and Peer-to-Peer NetworksIn this paper, we study the problem of discovering multiple resource holders and how to evaluate a node's satisfaction in query incentive networks. Utilizing an acyclic tree, we show that query propagation has a nature of exponential start, polynomial growth, and eventually becoming a constant. We model the query propagation as an extensive game, obtain nodes' greedy behaviors from Nash equilibrium analysis, and show the impairment of greedy behaviors via a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. We demonstrate that cooperation enforcement is required to achieve the optimal state of resource discovery. © 2011 IEEE.published_or_final_versionThe 8th IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference (CCNC 2011), Las Vegas, NV., 9-12 January 2011. In Proceedings of the 8th CCNC, 2011, p. 1000-100