It is shown that the core of a coalitional production economy with a balanced technology (Bohm [1974]) is nonempty, even if the consumers have preferences which are intransitive, provided the preferences are convex and continuous. Since such preferences cannot be represented by utility functions, this result does not follow from the nonemptiness of the core of a characteristic function game. Rather, the approach is closer to that of Ichiishi's [1981] social coalitional equilibrium
We consider economies with preferences drawn from a very general class of strongly convex preference...
Proceedings of The First Symposium on Non-Linear Analysis : CONVEXITY, CHAOS AND FRACTALS / edited b...
It is known that the classical theorems of Grodal [Grodal, B., 1972. A second remark on the core of ...
It is shown that the core of a coalitional production economy with a balanced technology (Bohm [1974...
[Introduction] To a large extent the cooperative theory of games has an altogether different appear...
A new concept of balancedness for games in normal form is introduced, called weak balanacedness. It...
Core existence results are proved for exchange economies with an infinite dimensional commodity spa...
Acyclicity of individual preferences is a minimal assumption in social choice theory. We replace th...
This note considers the equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation games in the general model...
It has long been known that in economies with satiation, the set of competitive equilibria does not ...
In cooperative Cournot oligopoly games, it is known that the alpha-core is equal to the beta-core, a...
This note considers the equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation games in the general model...
This paper analyses the properties of (strong) core allocations in a two-period asymmetric informati...
It is known that in large economies with strongly convex preferences, the commodity bundles agents r...
Abstract. In a general model of indivisible good allocation, Sönmez (1999) established that, whenev...
We consider economies with preferences drawn from a very general class of strongly convex preference...
Proceedings of The First Symposium on Non-Linear Analysis : CONVEXITY, CHAOS AND FRACTALS / edited b...
It is known that the classical theorems of Grodal [Grodal, B., 1972. A second remark on the core of ...
It is shown that the core of a coalitional production economy with a balanced technology (Bohm [1974...
[Introduction] To a large extent the cooperative theory of games has an altogether different appear...
A new concept of balancedness for games in normal form is introduced, called weak balanacedness. It...
Core existence results are proved for exchange economies with an infinite dimensional commodity spa...
Acyclicity of individual preferences is a minimal assumption in social choice theory. We replace th...
This note considers the equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation games in the general model...
It has long been known that in economies with satiation, the set of competitive equilibria does not ...
In cooperative Cournot oligopoly games, it is known that the alpha-core is equal to the beta-core, a...
This note considers the equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation games in the general model...
This paper analyses the properties of (strong) core allocations in a two-period asymmetric informati...
It is known that in large economies with strongly convex preferences, the commodity bundles agents r...
Abstract. In a general model of indivisible good allocation, Sönmez (1999) established that, whenev...
We consider economies with preferences drawn from a very general class of strongly convex preference...
Proceedings of The First Symposium on Non-Linear Analysis : CONVEXITY, CHAOS AND FRACTALS / edited b...
It is known that the classical theorems of Grodal [Grodal, B., 1972. A second remark on the core of ...